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INTRODUCTION
Western society is now more than three centuries past the scientific revolution, yet courts 
continue to treat facts, and the scientific methods used to find those facts, much as the Catholic 
Church did in the time of Galileo.  This is especially so in the constitutional arena.  The Supreme 
Court considers the empirical world to be a constituent part of doctrine.1  Facts don’t so much 
exist as serve to buttress a world view emanating out of a holy text.  In the case of the High 
Court, that text is the Constitution.  But just as the Church lost credibility when it was dismissive 
of science, the Court endangers its legitimacy by maintaining a jurisprudence that is inattentive to 
scientific advances.  In this Article, I propose both a theoretical justification for an empirically 
enlightened constitutional jurisprudence and a framework through which such a jurisprudence 
might be practiced.  Given that the Constitution was framed on the principles of the 
enlightenment, it is about time that the courts enter the scientific age.
1 See David L. Faigman, “Normative Constitutional Fact-Finding”: Exploring the 
Empirical Component of Constitutional Interpretation, 139 U. PA. L. REV. 541 (1991); see also 
Rachel N. Pine, Speculation and Reality: The Role of Facts in Judicial Protection of 
Fundamental Rights, 136 U. PA. L. REV. 655 (1988); Dean M. Hashimoto, Science as Mythology 
in Constitutional Law, 76 OR. L. REV. 111 (1997); Adam Hoffman, Note, Corralling 
Constitutional Fact: De Novo Fact Review in the Federal Appellate Courts, 50 DUKE L.J. 1427 
(2001); Frank R. Strong, The Persistent Doctrine of “Constitutional Fact,” 46 N.C. L. REV. 
(1968); Frank R. Strong, Dilemma Aspects of the Doctrine of “Constitutional Fact,” 47  N.C. L. 
REV. 311 (1969); Jeffrey M. Shaman, Constitutional Fact: The Perception of Reality by the 
Supreme Court, 35 U. FLA. L. REV. 236 (1983); Ann Woolhandler, Rethinking the Judicial 
Reception of Legislative Facts, 41 VAND. L. REV. 111 (1988)..
-3-
 
The Supreme Court habitually employs factual predicates in its constitutional 
jurisprudence.2 Yet the Court has never developed an intelligible constitutional fact 
jurisprudence.  Indeed, the term itself is often used to describe only one type of fact – case-
specific (or adjudicative) facts – when facts operate at multiple levels of constitutional 
adjudication, from law definition to law application.3  No standards apply to courts’ reception of 
constitutional fact-based evidence.  Constitutional facts come to courts’ attention through expert 
witnesses, legislative records, and briefs.  Juries occasionally decide them and at other times 
judges do so.  There has never been an attempt to set procedural rules for constitutional fact-
finding.  Burdens of proof are left, at best, implicit, and are usually overlooked completely.  
Moreover, no general rules apply concerning the standard of appellate review of constitutional 
facts.  While a few scholars have weighed in on some of the issues presented by constitutional 
facts,4 the subject remains adrift in an epistemological fog.  Fact-finding at the Court seems to 
occur in the twilight zone between doctrine and its application.  Facts do not so much as inform 
constitutional law as serve doctrinal choices made on other grounds.  Inconvenient facts, 
therefore, are interpreted – molded really – to conform to jurisprudential necessities.  The Court’s 
failure to develop a comprehensive constitutional-fact jurisprudence effectively gives it broad 
latitude to find facts flexibly.  The absence of any consistent conception of the place of facts in 
constitutional cases permits the Court the freedom to employ facts unconstrained by principle.
2 See DAVID L. FAIGMAN, LABORATORY OF JUSTICE: THE SUPREME COURT’S 200-
YEAR STRUGGLE TO INTEGRATE SCIENCE AND THE LAW (2004); I. BERNARD COHEN, SCIENCE AND 
THE FOUNDING FATHERS (1995).
3 I use the term “constitutional fact” to refer to all facts used in constitutional cases, 
whether they are relied upon to interpret the Constitution or are relevant to the application of 
particular constitutional provisions.  See Section II for a discussion of the different kinds of 
constitutional facts.
4 The corpus of scholarship on the immense subject of constitutional fact-finding is 
relatively small, though the subject has interested some better known scholars.  See Kenneth 
Karst, Legislative Facts in Constitutional Litigation, SUP. CT. REV. 75 (1960); Laurence H. 
Tribe, Seven Deadly Sins of Straining the Constitution Through a Pseudo-Scientific Sieve, 36 
HASTINGS L.J. 155(1984); Henry P. Monaghan, Constitutional Fact Review, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 
229 (1985).
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In this Article, I propose a unified theory of constitutional facts.  Section I sketches the 
basic parameters of the Court’s current approach to constitutional fact-finding, which closely 
adheres to what Professor Ronald Dworkin calls “interpretive” fact-finding.  It is the Court’s 
manner to treat facts as being highly malleable and to employ them to serve doctrinal ends.  Facts 
do not exist separately from the fact-finder; they are interpreted rather than found.  They are 
largely articles of faith.  Interpretive fact-finding has the salutary effect that a changing factual 
landscape will not endanger settled constitutional precedent.  But this is their greatest weakness 
too, for the Court’s approach neither accounts for nor provides a systematic method by which to 
integrate changed factual understandings into constitutional doctrine.  Ultimately, ignoring the 
empirical component of constitutional adjudication will threaten the legitimacy of the Court’s 
pronouncements.
Constitutional facts come in a variety of forms, with some serving to define the 
Constitution’s meaning and others relevant only in particular cases.  Section II describes the 
different kinds of constitutional fact and discusses their relationship to one another and to 
constitutional doctrine more generally.  In addition, this section examines how different kinds of 
constitutional fact might be proven in constitutional adjudication.  Different facts demand 
different procedural rules of proof, and this part considers the sources of proof and the sorts of 
burdens of proof that should apply to the different levels of fact-finding in constitutional cases.
A large component of constitutional fact-finding lies in the dynamic between legal 
decision-makers.  Constitutional facts are found by all those charged with making decisions 
having constitutional import, including, among others, police officers, school boards, 
legislatures, juries, trial court judges, and appellate courts.  A unified theory of constitutional 
facts must account for the highly complex dynamic between these various decision-makers.  
Section III considers this issue as regards facts found (or reviewed by) courts, up, down, and 
across the judicial hierarchy.  This part focuses on three principal areas in which this dynamic is 
most prominent in constitutional adjudication.  First, it examines judicial review of constitutional 
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facts found at trial and, in particular, the jury’s role in the constitutional law dynamic.  Second, it 
examines possibly the highest profile situation in constitutional adjudication, that of judicial 
review of a legislature’s constitutional fact-finding.  Finally, this section turns to possibly the 
most controversial – and surely the most interesting – subject involving constitutional fact-
finding, whether lower courts can sometimes review the fact-finding of higher courts, and 
thereby depart from precedent when the facts, or our knowledge of the facts, change.
I. “INTERPRETIVE” FACT-FINDING
Fact-finding is an essential component of both constitutional interpretation and 
constitutional application.  Historically, however, courts and commentators have sought to avoid 
this essential truth – and for good reason.  Facts are highly indeterminate and they inevitably 
destabilize the sought-after stability of fundamental constitutional values.  For instance, many 
commentators were highly critical of the Supreme Court’s seeming reliance on social science 
research in Brown v. Board of Education.5  In concluding that segregated schools were 
“inherently unequal,” the Brown Court cited the work of Dr. Kenneth Clark and others that 
indicated that blacks suffered psychological harm as a result of segregation.6  Many prominent 
commentators challenged the Court’s use of science on the basis either that the findings were 
obvious or largely irrelevant.  Professor Ronald Dworkin, for example, beginning with a premise 
from another scholar, argued both of these together:
“We don’t need evidence for the proposition that segregation is an insult to the Black 
community – we know it; we know it the way we know that a cold causes snuffles.”  It is 
not that we don’t need to know it nor that there isn’t something there to know.  There is a 
fact of the matter, namely that segregation is an insult, but we need no evidence for that 
5 347 U.S. 433 (1954).  See, e.g., Edmund Cahn, “Jurisprudence,” 30 N.Y.U. L. 
REV. 150, 157-58 (1955) (“I would not have the constitutional rights of Negroes – or of other 
Americans – rest on any such flimsy foundation as some of the scientific demonstrations in these 
records.”).
6 Brown, 347 U.S. at 494 n.11.
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fact – we just know it.  It’s an interpretive fact.7
Dworkin’s term “interpretive fact” is a component of a legal theory he calls “creative” or 
“constructive” interpretation.8  He analogizes constitutional interpretation to the writing of the 
latest chapter of a chain novel.9  The interpreter fits his or her interpretations into the prior 
chapters and, at the same time, extends the overall work in the “best possible” direction.  The 
theory contemplates first that the interpreter identify the “fit” between the interpretive history and 
the practice being interpreted and, second, that the interpreter impose a “purpose on an object or 
practice in order to make of it the best possible example of the form or genre to which it is taken 
to belong.”10
The difficulty in Dworkin’s formulation, for present purposes, lies in understanding the 
role of science in this legal-interpretive discourse.  Science certainly is used by the law as a 
means to accomplish certain objectives.  But science, at least good science, does not permit  any 
interpretation the interpreter desires, much less the “best possible.”  Although science cannot 
entirely divorce itself from its social context, sound science and reputable scientists have no 
preset agendas about the proper shape that the world should take.  The law, in contrast, is 
7 Ronald Dworkin, Social Sciences and Constitutional Rights – The Consequences 
of Uncertainty, J. L. & EDUC. 6 (1977): 3, 5  (quoting Cahn, supra note XX, 157-58).
8 A second component of Dworkin’s notion of interpretive facts is his belief that the 
social sciences are not sufficiently valid to support constitutional rulings.  For example, Dworkin 
argues that “[w]hile in physics it is now thought to be an unsound judgment that rests merely on 
correlation between observable events unsupported by some notion of the mechanics that 
translate the cause to the effect, social science is only able to provide correlations without the 
mechanics.”  Id.  Dworkin’s criticism displays an unhealthy amount of “physics envy.”  See
David L. Faigman, To Have and Have Not: Assessing the Value of Social Science to the Law as 
Science and Policy, 38 EMORY L.J. 1005 (1989).
9 RONALD DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE (1986).  See also Ronald Dworkin, Law as 
Interpretation, 60 TEX. L. REV. 527, 540-46 (1982).  For an analysis of the chain novel 
metaphor, see Stanley Fish, “Working on the Chain Gang’ Interpretation in Law and 
Literature,” TEX. L. REV. 60 (1982): 551.
10 Dworkin (1986), supra note XX, at 52.
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primarily about setting such agendas.  Whereas the insult associated with segregation may be 
plain legally (at least after 1954), just how plain it is as a matter of science depends on the data.  
How, then, should scientific interpretation be combined with legal interpretation?  Although 
Dworkin has yet to address this specific issue, his chain of logic can be considered in regard to its 
application to the matter at hand.
If, as Dworkin apparently accepts, “there is a fact of the matter,” even such a fact as the 
insult attributable to segregation, when is that “real-world” fact relevant and when is its 
interpretive cousin relevant?  If all constitutional facts are repackaged under Dworkin’s 
definition as merely interpretive facts, this solves one problem by creating another one.  It solves 
the problem inherent in basing constitutional doctrine on indeterminate and changeable factual 
premises.  Accordingly, in the Brown example, it would not matter what quantum of evidence 
might later be adduced to demonstrate the salutary attributes of state-sponsored segregation.  If 
the fact is interpretive, no amount of data could ever disprove the “fact” that segregation is
insulting.  It is so, like other constitutional matters, because the Court says so.  The problem this 
fact-finding by fiat creates, however, is the almost certain erosion of the legitimacy of Court 
pronouncements.  Despite the elegance of Dworkin’s efforts, the empirical world still exists 
outside the Court’s dictates.  Facts are what they are, and the Court’s insistence otherwise makes 
it appear dogmatic.
Dworkin’s approach relies on an expansive notion of “facts.”  In his view, facts are elastic 
enough to be able to serve the normative needs of the Constitution.  But the question is, can we 
make facts mean whatever we want them to mean?  Dworkin seems to vacillate between 
describing constitutional facts as a function of normative judgment and believing them to be a 
matter of common sense experience.  But the former – “normative facts” – are reminiscent of the 
practices of the Sixteenth Century Catholic Church, and the latter resemble a caricatured version 
of the Seventeenth Century inductive methods of Francis Bacon.  We may know, as Dworkin 
argues we should know “interpretively,” “that a cold causes snuffles.”  But surely, if the 
“interpretive” judgment is accurate, valid scientific studies should corroborate that judgment.  
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Science is not irrelevant for demonstrating what everyone believes to be the case, though courts 
might wish to relegate studies corroborating the relationship between a cold and snuffles to a 
footnote.  And some day, to our surprise, it might turn out that a malady only associated with 
colds causes snuffles, and that we were wrong the whole time.  Certainly, researchers should not 
be discouraged from studying the question on the basis that we know it to be true because we 
know it to be true.
In practice, of course, so-called “interpretive facts” play a steadying role.  This utility is 
their virtue.  Seen as an interpretive fact, the deleterious effects of segregation are not open to 
reexamination.  An interpretive fact thus corresponds neatly with traditional notions of 
constitutional doctrine, in that neither need change except by dictate of the Court.  Real facts, in 
contrast, are mercurial.  Given their proclivity for change, either because our knowledge of the 
facts improves over time or the facts themselves change, they seem to provide a disturbingly 
unsteady foundation for constitutional doctrine.  Described as a factual matter, therefore, the 
holding in Brown that blacks are disadvantaged by segregation would appear vulnerable to 
refutation by well-designed studies that indicate that blacks are not disadvantaged or, even, are 
better off with this practice.  This is probably not an occurrence to which the Court gave much 
thought when drafting the Brown opinion.  Almost certainly, the justices would have agreed with 
the gist of Dworkin’s argument, that changing facts regarding segregation’s insult did not 
undermine the continuing validity of Brown.  This proposition, however, was eventually tested in 
a courtroom in Savannah-Chatham, Georgia.
In 1963, in Stell v.  Savannah-Chatham,11 the county defended a desegregation suit on the 
basis that black children were not, in fact, psychologically harmed by attending segregated 
schools.  The plaintiffs argued that the district court had no discretion to reopen this factual 
question.  According to the plaintiffs, it had been conclusively determined by the Supreme Court 
in Brown that segregation harmed black children.   The trial court in Stell disagreed.  The court 
explained that the lower court in Brown had found that “‘segregation with the sanction of law ... 
11 220 F.Supp. 667 (S.D.Ga. 1963).
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has a tendency to (retard) the educational and mental development of Negro children and to 
deprive them of some of the benefits they would receive in a racial[ly] integrated school 
system.’”12 The judge stated, “[t]hese are facts, not law,” explaining:
Whether Negroes in Kansas believed that separate schooling denoted inferiority, whether 
a sense of inferiority affected their motivation to learn was increased or diminished by 
segregation was a question requiring evidence for decision.  That was as much a subject 
for scientific inquiry as the braking distance required to stop a two-ton truck moving at 
ten miles an hour on dry concrete.13
Based on the expert testimony introduced in the case, the trial court concluded that “prejudices, 
whether ethnic, religious or racial, increase rather than decrease in proportion to the degree of 
non-voluntary contact between separately identifiable groups.”14  The court said that this “is a 
psychological phenomenon which was noted in the time of Periclean Greece.”15  Moreover, 
modern “studies made of actual intermixing of groups in classrooms confirm the predicted result 
that an increase in cross-group contacts increases pre-existing racial hostility rather than 
ameliorates it.”16
On appeal, the Fifth Circuit summarily reversed the Stell district court.  The appellate 
court admonished that “no inferior federal court may refrain from acting as required by [the 
Brown] decision even if such a court should conclude that the Supreme Court erred either as to 
its facts or as to the law.”17  Moreover, the circuit court discounted the importance of the social 
science evidence for the Brown result.  “We do not read the major premise of the decision of the 
Supreme Court in the first Brown case as being limited to the facts of the cases there presented.  
12 Id. at 677-78.
13 Id. at 678.
14 Id. at 674.
15 Id.
16 Id.
17 333 F.2d 55, 61 (5th Cir. 1964).
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We read it as proscribing segregation in the public education process on the stated ground that 
separate but equal schools for the races were inherently unequal.”18
The Fifth Circuit effectively understood Brown “interpretively,” in that the facts set forth 
in 1954 had become established law a decade later.19  This creative approach to constitutional 
facts can be found in many cases.20  Typically, the Court’s first entry into a particular 
constitutional arena involves an ostensibly serious evaluation of the relevant factual 
underpinnings of the eventual holding.  Subsequently, however, the precedent hardens into 
established constitutional doctrine and, as a consequence, the factual premises petrify.21  If the 
relevant facts were not “interpretive” at the start, they become so once the case has entered the 
lexicon of settled law.
Treating facts interpretively solves the problem of having changeable constitutional 
standards due to a changing understanding of the empirical world.  The factual premises are 
“interpreted” in conformance with the constitutional outcome, notwithstanding evidence to the 
contrary.  But this stability comes at a cost.  A rule that has outlived its reasons for being is 
correctly seen as illegitimate.  As various justices have lamented, advancing technology threatens 
the stability of established precedent in a multitude of constitutional contexts.22  If, for example, 
18 Id.
19 The latter argument – that the major premise of Brown depended on the normative 
proposition that segregated schools were “inherently unequal” – effectively reads the factual 
dispute out of the decision.   
20 See generally, Faigman (1991), supra note XX.
21 See, e.g., Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, 462 U.S. 458 (1983) 
(Despite changes in medical technology that permitted abortions in 1983 to be performed more 
safely than childbirth through at least week 16, the Court held that “[t]he Roe trimester standard 
... continues to provide a reasonable legal framework for limiting a State’s authority to regulate 
abortions.”); United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 751 (1987) (“‘[T]here is nothing inherently 
unattainable about a prediction of future criminal conduct.’”) (quoting Schall v. Martin, 467 U.S. 
253, 276 (1984)).
22 See, e.g., Ashcroft v. ACLU, 124 S.Ct. 2783 (2004).  See generally Stuart Minor 
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the right of reproductive choice is based on the medical concept of viability – the time after 
which a fetus is likely to survive outside the womb – the Court’s failure to follow advancing 
technology will undermine the cogency of the precedent.  The rule in Roe v. Wade23 provides that 
states cannot prohibit abortions pre-viability, a point-in-time of around 24-28 weeks in 1973 and 
closer to 22-24 weeks today.  However unlikely a technological revolution in viability might 
appear today, advances in this area could move viability considerably closer to conception.24  If a 
woman’s basic right of choice is truly based on the values associated with viability, then 
presumably the right should change as technology changes.
But such a changeable constitutional jurisprudence could itself be derided as 
illegitimate.25  Dworkin’s interpretive fact approach ingeniously resolves this dilemma, since 
interpretive facts are as solid as the doctrine demands or as flexible as they need to be in order to 
allow the doctrine to evolve.  Under this approach, because constitutional facts are “interpreted” 
and not “found,” justices can employ them with little fear that future researchers might call into 
question the premises of their handiwork.
Yet, the world does not always cooperate with the wishes of the justices or constitutional 
scholars.  At least on occasion, scientists will demonstrate the errors in the Court’s factual 
premises with enough certainty to engender doubt over the soundness of the Court’s logic.  
Indeed, this can be expected to occur with increasing frequency as basic scientific methods 
improve or the Court finds facts that are amenable to more definitive proof.  Opinions that 
employ facts interpretively are more reminiscent of holy writ than reasoned and informed legal 
Benjamin, Stepping Into the Same River Twice: Rapidly Changing Facts and the Appellate 
Process, 78 TEX. L. REV. 269 (1999).
23 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
24 See generally LAURENCE H. TRIBE, ABORTION (1990).
25 See Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 754 (1997) (Souter, J., concurring) 
(discussing need to avoid establishing constitutional standards on factual premises that might 
change as more research is done).
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judgment.  But there is no inherent contradiction between enlightened factual investigation and a 
cogent constitutional jurisprudence.  Constitutional doctrine should be informed by contemporary 
understandings of the empirical world.  By necessity, such an approach would take into account 
the dynamic nature of fact-finding and science, albeit in combination with the critical need for 
some measure of steadiness in constitutional doctrine.  
Just how much unsteadiness would be created by a changeable factual landscape depends 
on the kinds of facts that are changing.  Some facts are used to establish the Constitution’s 
meaning and underlie the doctrines that apply to all similarly situated claims.  When these facts 
change, whole areas of jurisprudence might be affected.  Other facts have more limited scope, 
involving only the immediate dispute and concern what happened to whom, where, and why.  
These facts would have little impact across constitutional cases when they fluctuated.  A 
workable jurisprudence of fact-finding must account for every type of fact, and this, in turn, must 
begin with the subject of the next section: categorizing the kinds of facts employed in 
constitutional claims.
II. THE CONFIGURATION OF CONSTITUTIONAL FACTS
The Constitution was intended, and is generally considered, to be an eminently practical 
document, so legal rules and decisions springing from it ought to be informed by the best 
evidence available.  Facts, whether they are the function of decades of Nobel-level research or 
the anecdotal observations of a police officer, come to the legal system in a wide variety of ways.  
Constitutional facts arrive in court through lay witnesses and expert testimony at trial, 
congressional (or other legislative) hearing testimony, amicus briefs, a court’s own research, and 
many others.  In court, constitutional facts might be the subject of jury deliberations, judicial 
determination, de novo appellate review, or some combination of all of these.  The dynamic 
among the different decision-makers ultimately depends upon the kinds of factual matters that 
the Constitution makes relevant.  Thus, as presented in Brown, whether the empirical 
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consequences of segregation by race are relevant in the first instance is a matter of constitutional 
interpretation.  Moreover, whether the focus is on the consequences at a particular school in a 
particular city or on those effects nationally, is also a matter of constitutional interpretation.26  In 
this section, I describe a framework by which the full range of constitutional facts can be 
classified.  Only once they have been sorted can an intelligible jurisprudence be applied to them.
A.   A Taxonomy of Constitutional Facts
In a landmark article, Professor Kenneth Culp Davis identified two basic kinds of facts 
having evidentiary significance.27  The first he termed “legislative facts,” and the second he 
called “adjudicative facts.”  According to Davis, legislative facts are those facts that have 
relevance to legal reasoning and the fashioning of legal rules.28  Adjudicative facts, in contrast, 
are relevant to the resolution of particular cases.  In a later text, Davis explained, “[a]djudicative 
facts usually answer the questions of who did what, where, when, how, why, with what motive or 
intent....  Legislative facts do not usually concern the immediate parties but are general facts 
which help the tribunal decide questions of law and policy and discretion.”29 Judges typically 
decide questions of legislative fact.30  Adjudicative facts, on the other hand, are usually within 
26 See infra note XX (discussing confusion during oral argument in Brown as to 
whether the challenge to segregation was based on evidence that applied generally or that only 
concerned the locales that were the subject of the litigation).
27 Kenneth Culp Davis, An Approach to Problems of Evidence in the Administrative 
Process, 55 HARV. L. REV. 364, 402-03 (1942).
28 See FED. R. EVID. 201(a) advisory committee’s note (“Legislative facts ... are 
those which have relevance to legal reasoning and the lawmaking process, whether in the 
formulation of a legal principle or ruling by a judge or court or in the enactment of a legislative 
body.”).
29 KENNETH CULP DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TEXT, § 7.03, at 160 (3d ed. 1972).
30 See id.; see also Davis, supra note XX, at 402 (noting that the rules of evidence 
for finding facts that form the basis for creation of law and policy should differ from the rules for 
finding facts specific to parties in a particular case).
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the province of the trier of fact (the jury or, if there is no jury, the judge) to decide.31
A key distinguishing feature between legislative and adjudicative facts is the level of 
decision-making at which the asserted facts are relevant.  Whereas legislative facts ordinarily 
relate to matters that transcend individual disputes and would likely recur in different cases 
involving similar subjects, adjudicative facts ordinarily are peculiar to a particular case.32  In 
McCleskey v. Kemp,33 for example, the petitioner claimed that Georgia’s capital sentencing 
scheme discriminated on the basis of the race of the victim.  This allegation was based on an 
extensive and sophisticated study conducted by David Baldus and his colleagues.  Among other 
things, Baldus concluded that, all things being equal, “defendants charged with killing white 
victims were 4.3 times as likely to receive a death sentence as defendants charged with killing 
blacks.”34  This discrimination claim was based on legislative facts, in that it was directed at the 
Georgia system as a whole and McCleskey offered no evidence that he personally was a victim of 
discrimination.  As Justice Powell, writing for the Court, pointed out, “[e]ven Professor Baldus 
does not contend that his statistics prove ... that race was a factor in McCleskey’s particular 
31 Professors John Monahan and Laurens Walker expanded upon the Davis 
dichotomy by adding a third category that they call “social frameworks.”  Laurens Walker and 
John Monahan, Social Frameworks: A New Use of Social Science in Law, 73 VA. L. REV. 559, 
563-570 (1987). 
32 The reason I say “ordinarily” is that there is a basic ambiguity inherent in Davis’ 
categories.  His division of facts into legislative and adjudicative categories is based on how the 
fact-finder employs the particular fact.  If the fact is used to resolve a particular litigation, it is, by 
definition, “adjudicative.”  This is so even though the factual issue may transcend a particular 
dispute, such as whether second-hand smoke causes lung cancer or silicone implants cause 
autoimmune disorders.  Similarly, if a legislature points to a particular case to support its 
lawmaking – as occurred in the “right-to-die” controversy involving Terri Schiavo in 2005 – this 
particularized fact is, by definition, “legislative.”  The scheme I develop in this section for the 
constitutional arena largely avoids this ambiguity, because the generality or specificity of the 
factual inquiry operates as the definitional feature of my framework.
33 481 U.S. 279 (1987).
34 Id. at 321.
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case.”35  Indeed, of great concern for the Court was that “McCleskey’s claim, taken to its logical 
conclusion, throws into serious question the principles that underlie our entire criminal justice 
system.”36  Legislative facts, as their name connotes, typically have broad impact across large 
areas of the law.
How the constitutionally relevant inquiry is described, therefore, as being at either the 
adjudicative or legislative level, obviously is of great importance.  In principle, the Constitution 
itself establishes what sorts of facts are relevant under its dictates.  In other words, the 
description of the relevant factual inquiry under a particular provision of the Constitution is a 
matter of interpretation.  In the cases leading up to McCleskey, for instance, the Court had 
indicated that substantial evidence of systemic discrimination would constitute an Eighth 
Amendment violation.37  The relevant facts under this earlier interpretation of the Eighth 
Amendment, then, were legislative in character.  In McCleskey, however, the Court stepped away 
from this precedent.  In its new interpretation of the Eighth Amendment, the Court redefined the 
level of relevant fact-finding.  The McCleskey Court said that the relevant facts under the Eighth 
Amendment were case specific, or adjudicative, and held that claims of systemic discrimination 
were insufficient to sustain a cause of action.  Under both the Eighth and Fourteenth 
Amendments, according to the Court, claimants had to demonstrate individualized 
discrimination.
Davis’ dichotomy generally describes the kind of fact-finding that occurs in constitutional 
cases and it has become the established vocabulary for describing the kinds of facts that are 
relevant to legal discourse.38  My approach roughly parallels Davis’, though the constitutional 
35 Id. at 308.
36 Id. at 314-15.
37 Id. at 323 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (“A constitutional violation is established if a 
plaintiff demonstrates a ‘pattern of arbitrary and capricious sentencing.’”) (quoting Gregg v. 
Georgia, 428 U.S. 195 n.46 (1976)).
38 Judge Robert Keeton has suggested the use of the term “premise facts” to describe 
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arena requires refinement of his scheme.  Davis’ legislative fact category can be further distilled 
in the constitutional context into two subcategories, “constitutional rule-facts” and 
“constitutional review-facts.”39  This revision turns out to have special relevance for constructing 
procedural rules in constitutional cases.40
Constitutional rule-facts are advanced to substantiate a particular interpretation of the 
Constitution.  Constitutional rule-facts join, and sometimes are a component of, the traditional 
sources of authority – the text, original intent, constitutional structure, precedent, scholarship, 
and contemporary values – in establishing the meaning of the Constitution.41  Indeed, one of the 
most common bases for constitutional interpretation, original intent, is almost wholly fact-based.  
Most debates over original intent resolve down to disagreements over historical facts, such as 
whether the drafters or ratifiers of the Fourteenth Amendment expected the Equal Protection 
Clause to invalidate segregated public schools42 or whether the Free Speech Clause was intended 
to cover obscenity.43  In addition, many arguments based on constitutional structure depend 
either implicitly or explicitly on hypotheses that might be the subject of political science or 
sociology.  John Marshall’s assertion in Marbury v. Madison,44 for instance, that legislators are 
any facts that support a reasoned decision of law or policy.”  Robert E. Keeton, Legislative Facts 
and Similar Things: Deciding Disputed Premise Facts, 73 MINN. L. REV. 1, 11 (1988).
39 [Identifying footnote removed.]
40 See Section III, infra (discussing different standards for when lower courts should 
have the authority to reconsider constitutional legislative facts depending on whether they are 
rule-facts or review-facts).
41 See Faigman, supra note XX, at 542-44; See generally Richard H. Fallon, Jr., A 
Constructivist Coherence Theory of Constitutional Interpretation, 100 Harv. L. Rev. 1189, 1244-
46 (19XX); Michael Perry, The Authority of Text, Tradition, and Reason: A Theory of 
Constitutional “Interpretation,” 58 CAL. L. REV. 551, 552 (1985).
42 See Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 433 (1954).
43 See Paris Adult Theatre v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49 (1973).
44 5 U.S. 137 (1803).
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less likely than judges to be bound by a written constitution, is a rule-fact of this sort.45  Rule-
facts, therefore, are employed to determine or justify the development of rules or standards that 
apply to all similarly situated cases.  Constitutional doctrine, of course, is replete with examples 
of such rules, including tiered-scrutiny in due process and equal protection, the Miller test for 
obscenity,46 Brandenburg’s incitement test,47 Crawford’s test of testimonial evidence under the 
Confrontation Clause,48 and so on.  Many of these were developed, in part, on the basis of factual 
arguments.  Moreover, virtually all of them establish constitutional inquiries that are answerable 
only by review-facts or adjudicative-facts.
Constitutional review-facts embody the more generally recognized function of legislative 
fact-finding in constitutional cases.  Courts examine constitutional review-facts under the
pertinent constitutional rule or standard in order to determine the constitutionality of some state 
or federal action.  Review-facts transcend particular disputes and thus can recur in identical form 
in different cases and varying jurisdictions.  Under the Commerce Clause, for instance, the 
applicable standard asks, among other things, whether the federal law “substantially affects 
interstate commerce.”49  A good example comes from Gonzales v. Raich,50 in which the Court 
determined whether Congress had the authority under the Commerce Clause to regulate the home 
production of marijuana.  Under the applicable standard, the Court had to consider whether 
Congress had a rational basis for concluding that home production of marijuana substantially 
affects price and national market conditions for marijuana.51  After reviewing the record and 
45 Id. at 137 (“The powers of the legislature are defined, and limited; and that those 
limits may not be mistaken, or forgotten, the Constitution is written”).
46 Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973).
47 Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969).
48 Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004).
49 Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 128-29 (1942).
50
 125 S.Ct. 2195 (2005).
51 Id. at 2197.
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Congress’ reasons for regulating, the Court concluded that “the regulation is squarely within 
Congress’ commerce power because production of [marijuana] ... has a substantial effect on 
supply and demand in the national market for that commodity.”52  The Court explained that 
“[o]ne need not have a degree in economics to understand why a nationwide exemption for the 
vast quantity of marijuana ... locally cultivated for personal use (which presumably would 
include use by friends, neighbors, and family members) may have a substantial impact on the 
interstate market for this extraordinarily popular substance.”53  The Court concluded that 
“Congress’ judgment is not only rational, but ‘visible to the naked eye,’ under any commonsense 
appraisal of the probable consequences of such an open-ended exemption.”54
Constitutional rule-facts and constitutional review-facts involve factual determinations 
that transcend particular cases and are relevant to either the formation of a constitutional rule or 
the application of a rule to similarly occurring cases, respectively.  Constitutional adjudicative-
facts, in contrast, refer to factual determinations that are relevant to the application of 
constitutional rules in particular cases.  For example, the question whether a police department 
“intentionally discriminated” against black police officers when it made promotion decisions 
based on an exam on which whites received significantly higher scores raises a constitutional 
adjudicative-fact issue.  Similarly, the likely consequences of Nazis marching through a 
predominantly Jewish neighborhood in Skokie, Illinois would be a constitutional adjudicative-
fact.  Adjudicative-facts, as their name implies, are specific to a particular proceeding and their 
resolution has limited precedential import.
Unfortunately, no bright lines mark the boundaries between different kinds of 
constitutional facts.  Because the procedural standards developed in Section III depend on these 
categorizations, however, ambiguity in this area is a matter of some consequence.  More 
52 Id. at 2197.
53 Id. at 2212.
54
 Id. (quoting Lopez, 514 U.S. at 563).
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problematic still, uncertainty surrounding categorization arises across the entire spectrum of 
constitutional facts.  The process of determining what facts are constitutionally relevant and what 
category they fall into must be determined on a case-by-case, or constitutional-provision by 
constitutional-provision, basis.  The next section explores the variables by which constitutional 
facts might be classified and the vagaries that attach to that scheme.
B.  Classifying Constitutional Facts
Constitutional rule-facts are marked by their relevance to the formation or justification of 
constitutional rules or standards.  Recognizing a constitutional rule-fact as such often will be 
fairly straightforward.  One of the most famous examples of a constitutional rule- fact comes from 
the litigation of Brown v. Board of Education.  The case was first heard during the Court’s 1952-
53 term.  Led by Chief Justice Vinson, a divided Court held the case over to the following term.  
The Court issued a series of questions for the parties to answer upon re-argument.  Several of 
these were directed at the historical question whether the drafters of the Fourteenth Amendment 
had intended to invalidate segregated public schools by guaranteeing the equal protection of the 
laws.55  In the opinion, Chief Justice Earl Warren, who had replaced Vinson, found that the 
historical materials were “not enough to resolve the problem with which we are faced.  At best, 
they are inconclusive.”56  The historical fact of the drafters’ and ratifiers’ intentions regarding the 
scope of the Fourteenth Amendment was thus ostensibly relevant to the meaning it was to be 
given, though in the end the Court believed that these facts were known with too little certainty 
to be relied upon.  Other authorities would have to be used.
55 Historians have since discovered that the Court was never particularly interested 
in the answer to this question, since, even before reargument, a majority supported invalidating 
segregation on other grounds.  See RICHARD KLUGER, SIMPLE JUSTICE (1975).  But the year delay 
had monumental consequences.  Chief Justice Vinson died that summer and was replaced by Earl 
Warren.  Chief Justice Warren orchestrated a unanimous opinion in the case that has come to 
symbolize the inception of modern constitutional jurisprudence.  See generally MICHAEL J. 
KLARMAN, FROM JIM CROW TO CIVIL RIGHTS (2004).
56 Brown, 347 U.S. at 489. 
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Rule-facts and review-facts both transcend individual cases, but the former are 
distinguishable on the basis that they are relevant to the definition of a constitutional rule, 
whereas the latter are relevant under some already defined constitutional rule.  Frequently, 
however, the line between constitutional rule-facts and constitutional-review facts is indistinct.  
The more controversial factual issue in Brown involved the Court’s citation to research 
indicating the negative effects of segregation on black school children.  But was this evidence 
used to support a categorical rule prohibiting segregation by race, or was it proof that was 
relevant under a different rule, one that queried whether the state had a sufficient justification for 
its discriminatory treatment?  The cases decided immediately after Brown suggest the former 
interpretation, that the studies were employed in service of a new per se rule prohibiting 
segregation by race.  After all, following Brown, the Court invalidated discrimination in a wide 
variety of public contexts and, along the way, never again mentioned social science data.57
Under this interpretation, the social science of Brown, to the extent that it had any value at all, 
was merely employed to justify a new rule of law.
With the benefit of hindsight, however, it appears that the constitutional issue of 
segregation’s effects is a review-fact and not a rule-fact.58  The modern rule provides that 
57 See New Orleans City Park Improvement Ass'n v. Detiege, 358 U.S. 54 (1958) 
(per curiam) (parks and recreational facilities); Gayle v. Browder, 352 U.S. 903 (1956) (per 
curiam) (buses); Holmes v. City of Atlanta, 350 U.S. 879 (1955) (per curiam) (golf courses); 
Mayor of Baltimore City v. Dawson, 350 U.S. 877 (1955) (per curiam) (beaches and 
bathhouses); see also Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority, 365 U.S. 715 (1961) (holding 
unlawful racial discrimination in restaurants in public buildings).
58 At oral argument in Brown, there was some confusion regarding whether 
segregation’s effect was an adjudicative fact or a legislative fact.  In the trials below, the 
petitioners had produced evidence on both issues, introducing general social science research 
conducted years earlier and also litigation-generated research in which students in the respective 
jurisdiction were tested using Kenneth Clark’s notorious doll-tests.  At the argument, the 
NAACP’s Robert Carter asked the Court to abide by the Topeka case’s finding of fact that 
segregation had deleterious psychological consequences.  He told the Court that the district 
judge’s factual findings make a reversal “necessary.”  He argued, “[i]f there [are inequalities] in 
fact, that educational opportunities cannot be equal in law.”  Justice Hugo Black asked him 
whether that was “‘a general finding or do you state that for the State of Kansas, City of 
Topeka?”  Surprisingly, Carter told the justices that “the finding refers to the State of Kansas and 
to these appellants and to Topeka, Kansas.”  He added, “I think that the findings were made in 
this specific case referring to this specific case.”  Black was troubled by the ramifications of 
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discrimination by race (or segregation) is unconstitutional unless the state’s scheme is justified 
by a compelling objective and the means used are closely tied to achieving that end.59  If 
Michigan, for example, were to create an all-black high school in Detroit that emphasized an 
African-American curriculum, the state’s means and ends would be strictly scrutinized rather 
than invalidated under some per se rule emanating from Brown and its progeny.  Presumably, any 
defense of this segregation scheme would be based largely on social science research regarding 
the benefits that would accrue to black students from a segregated high school education.60  The 
rule of Brown and its progeny seems to be that segregation by race is highly suspect, but that it 
may be possible for a state to justify such disparate treatment if its reasons are sufficiently 
compelling.  But, admittedly, the matter is not free of all ambiguity.  Nothing inherent in a 
particular constitutional fact dictates whether it is a rule- or review-fact.  Categorization depends 
on how a particular court employs the fact, and this might only be determined in particular 
constitutional contexts by subsequent case law.61
limiting the empirical lesson to the single case of Topeka and asked whether this meant that 
“then you would have different rulings with respect to the places to which this applies, is that 
true?”  Carter quickly realized his error, though in his haste to backtrack he too readily 
abandoned the general social science available.  He argued, “[n]ow, of course, under our theory, 
you do not have to reach the finding of fact or a fact at all in reaching the decision because of the 
fact that we maintain that this is an unconstitutional classification being based upon race and, 
therefore, it is arbitrary.”  MARK WHITMAN, ed., REMOVING A BADGE OF SLAVERY 131-32 (1993).
59 See, e.g., Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200 (1995) (applying strict 
scrutiny to race-conscious affirmative action programs).
60 See, e.g., United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515 (1996) (In this case involving 
gender segregation at VMI, much of the litigation proceeded on the assumption that the State 
could, if its reasons were compelling enough, justify separate military training for men and 
women.).
61 The sometimes ambiguous character of constitutional facts complicates the task of 
establishing a rational constitutional-fact jurisprudence, but it is not fatal to that effort and this 
level of uncertainty is not unknown in constitutional cases.  Consider, for example, the 
longstanding debate over whether the Miranda rule was constitutionally mandated or a judicially 
enacted remedy that could be revisited by legislative majorities.  This ambiguity remained in the 
law for more than 30 years. Compare Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) (setting forth the 
now-famous “Miranda warning,” but leaving open the question whether it was constitutionally 
based) with Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 444 (2000) (“Miranda announced a 
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The line distinguishing constitutional adjudicative-facts from other constitutional facts 
can also be elusive.  In principle, adjudicative facts should be readily recognizable.  
Constitutional adjudicative-facts involve only the case before the respective court and their 
resolution should have little or no precedential value.  Under the Miller test, for instance, one of 
three necessary findings of fact involves whether the allegedly offending materials appeal to the 
prurient interest.62  This fact is determined on a case-by-case basis in light of local community 
standards.  A finding in a Lexington, Virginia court that a particular Mapplethorpe photograph is 
obscene, therefore, does not bind a court in Richmond, Virginia that might be evaluating the 
same photograph.  Similarly, in a libel action under New York Times v. Sullivan,63 the question 
whether a false statement was made with “actual malice” will be unique to that particular case.  
Categorizing a fact as adjudicative or legislative will often be a straightforward exercise.
On occasion, however, determining whether a particular constitutional fact is adjudicative 
in character will not be obvious.  Another component of the Miller test illustrates this very point.  
The third prong of the test requires, for a finding of obscenity, that “the work, taken as a whole, 
lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value.”64  Although this fact is to be 
determined in individual cases for specific materials in dispute, the question involves matters that 
transcend particular cases.  Whether Nabokov’s Lolita, for instance, has serious literary or artistic 
value is a fact of general import, and is not readily classified into either the review-fact or 
adjudicative-fact bins.  In the end, the decision whether to label a particular fact as adjudicative 
or otherwise may depend on what procedural path the court wants the fact to walk.65
constitutional rule that Congress may not supersede legislatively.”).  At the same time, however, 
because I prescribe very different rules of procedure for the different kinds of constitutional facts, 
any ambiguity over what kind of facts are at stake will increase the uncertainty endemic to the 
process.
62 Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973).
63 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
64 Miller, 413 U.S. at 15.
65 This is the lesson that Professors Ronald Allen and Michael Pardo draw – and 
advocate – in their excellent article on the law-fact distinction.  Ronald J. Allen & Michael S. 
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The very act of classifying a fact as a rule-, review-, or adjudicative-fact is an interpretive 
exercise.  A good example of the freedom inherent in classifying constitutional facts, and the 
policy ramifications that follow from such classifications, comes from the Court’s standard for 
reviewing the constitutionality of abortion regulations.  In Planned Parenthood of Southeastern 
Pennsylvania v. Casey,66 the Court ruled that regulations that impose an undue burden on the 
exercise of the right to a pre-viability abortion are unconstitutional.  The undue burden standard 
was operationally defined to include any regulation that created a “substantial obstacle” to the
exercise of the right.67  In Casey, the Court invalidated the spousal notification provision of the 
disputed law applying this rule.  The opinion for the Court, written jointly by Justices O’Connor, 
Kennedy, and Souter, treated the issue as a review-fact, finding that research indicated that 
domestic violence might occur in a small percentage of cases as a result of this notification 
requirement.  There was no suggestion that the claimants before the Court had experienced, or 
were in danger of suffering, violence due to the spousal notification requirement.  Yet the 
prospect of such violence in the class of possible complainants, even if it constituted only a small 
percentage of cases, was enough to invalidate the law in all cases.68
At the same time, the Casey Court upheld the 24-hour waiting provision, finding the 
proof inadequate to conclude that such requirements unduly burden the right.  But does this issue 
implicate a review-fact or an adjudicative-fact and, if the former, was the appropriate domain the 
nation or the state?   In a Woman’s Choice-East Side Women’s Clinic v. Newman,69 the Seventh 
Circuit offered a confusing, if not confused, answer to this question.  The district court had 
enjoined Indiana’s informed consent law shortly after it was enacted on the basis that it would 
Pardo, The Myth of the Law-Fact Distinction, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 1769 (2003).
66 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
67 Id. at 846.
68 Id. at 892, 894-95.
69 305 F.3d 684 (7th Cir. 2002).
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constitute an undue burden.70  Under the Indiana law, women had to wait at least 24-hours after 
receiving information regarding the risks of the abortion procedure, thus necessitating two visits 
to the abortion provider.  The lower court enjoined this provision on the basis of empirical 
studies conducted in Mississippi and Utah that indicated that the higher costs it imposed would 
reduce the number of abortions performed in those states by 10% to 13% .71  Yet, as pointed out 
by the Seventh Circuit, no research was available regarding the effect that the present 
requirement would have in Indiana and the researchers had not compared the experience of 
Mississippi and Utah to Indiana.72  At the same time, however, depending on how the legal 
question was defined, the research might not have to apply specifically to Indiana at all for the 
Indiana law to be invalidated on the basis of that research.  In other cases, the Court had 
employed a national scope for determining when abortion regulations constituted undue burdens.  
In Casey itself, as noted above, the Court struck down the spousal notification provision based on 
general research and did not inquire regarding state-wide experience under the challenged 
Pennsylvania law.  Similarly, in Stenberg v. Carhart,73 the Court used a national lens to view the 
pertinent facts when it invalidated a Nebraska law that prohibited the use of “intact dilation and 
extraction,” or what critics have dubbed “partial-birth abortion.”74  In subsequent litigation over 
this issue, in particular involving congressional legislation on the subject, courts have routinely 
considered the relevant level of analysis to be at the review-fact stage.75
70 A Woman’s Choice East Side Women’s Clinic v. Newman, 132 F.Supp.2d 1150, 
1151 (S.D.Ind. 2001).
71 Id. at 1173.
72 305 F.3d at 689.
73 530 U.S. 914 (2000).
74 Id. at 921.
75 See Hope Clinic v. Ryan, 195 F.3d 857, 884 (7th Cir. 1999) (Posner, J., 
dissenting) (“The health effects of partial birth abortion should indeed be treated as a legislative 
fact, rather than an adjudicative fact, in order to avoid inconsistent results arising from the 
reactions of different district judges…to different records.”), vacated 530 U.S. 1271 (2000).  
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In cases like Casey and Stenberg, the national approach served the strong jurisprudential 
value of ensuring consistent constitutional outcomes from state to state.76  The Newman court 
explained the Supreme Court’s logic:
[C]onstitutionality must be assessed at the level of legislative fact, rather than 
adjudicative fact determined by more than 650 district judges.  Only treating the matter as 
one of legislative fact produces the nationally uniform approach that Stenberg demands.77
The Seventh Circuit, however, after setting forth this sound explication of why the Court 
framed the relevant facts under the undue burden test as national legislative facts, devoted the 
lion’s share of its opinion to evaluating the applicability of the research to the operation of the 
challenged provision in Indiana.  The court observed that, “because the undue-burden approach 
does not prescribe a choice between the legislative-fact and adjudicative-fact approaches, we 
think it appropriate to review the evidence in this record and the inferences that properly may be 
drawn at the pre-enforcement stage.”78  Based on this analysis – what essentially constituted a 
state level review-fact analysis – the Seventh Circuit reversed the district court’s ruling:
Indiana is entitled to an opportunity to have its law evaluated in light of experience in 
Indiana.... [I]t is an abuse of discretion for a district judge to issue a pre-enforcement 
injunction while the effects of the law (and reasons for those effects) are open to debate.  
What happened in Mississippi and Utah does not imply that the effects in Indiana are 
bound to be unconstitutional, so Indiana ... is entitled to put its law into effect and have 
that law judged by its own consequences.79
The logic of the Seventh Circuit’s Newman decision is not obvious.  If, indeed, Stenberg 
specifically, and this area of the law more generally, “demands” the application of a “uniform 
approach,” then the “experience in Indiana” is not particularly relevant to the ultimate 
determination.  It may be that the Mississippi and Utah studies were not sufficiently valid or 
persuasive to conclude that, on a national scale, informed consent provisions like Indiana’s 
76 Newman, 305 F.3d at 688.
77 Id.
78 Newman, 305 F.3d at 688-89.
79 Id. at 693 (emphasis in original).
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unduly burden the abortion right.  But that is a very different determination than saying that the 
research does not apply in Indiana.  Indiana’s particular experience is largely irrelevant under 
Casey’s and Stenberg’s apparent interpretation of the relevant level of factual inquiry.
As already emphasized, the issue of what level of factual inquiry – i.e., adjudicative-, 
review-, or rule-fact – should be employed in a particular constitutional context is an interpretive 
matter.  Both Casey and Stenberg appear to treat the applicable inquiry under the undue burden 
standard as a nationally-defined review-fact.  It is possible, however, to distinguish the 24-hour 
waiting provision from the Casey and Stenberg subjects of spousal notification and late-term 
abortion.  Whereas the Casey and Stenberg subjects do not vary from place to place, a 24-hour 
waiting provision might be more or less burdensome depending on the state in which it operates.  
Waiting 24 hours might be a very substantial obstacle in Oklahoma or Utah, but not particularly 
burdensome in Rhode Island or Delaware, because of the respective distances some women 
might have to travel to obtain abortion services.  Regardless, whatever the judgment regarding 
the level of fact that is relevant under a particular constitutional provision, it should be an explicit 
part of the constitutional analysis.
Although sorting constitutional facts into their respective categories appears to be 
somewhat haphazard, certain conclusions can be offered in regard to this process.  First of all, the 
distinction between adjudicative-facts and review- and rule-facts in constitutional cases is clear 
in theory, if not always in practice.  Adjudicative-facts pertain to specific cases and have little or 
no precedential force, while review- and rule-facts are general in nature and usually have import 
as a matter of precedent.  These general facts will sometimes be relevant to the definition of the 
constitutional rule itself (i.e., constitutional rule-facts) or, more often, will be relevant when some 
rule is applied to a set of general facts (i.e., constitutional review-facts).  Second, the decision 
whether the relevant fact under a particular constitutional rule falls into one category or another 
is an interpretive judgment; and it is a judgment that should always be made explicitly.  Under 
Casey’s undue burden standard, as discussed above, the determination whether a 24-hour waiting 
provision constitutes a “substantial obstacle” could be an adjudicative-fact or a review-fact.  
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Indeed, at the review-fact level, the pertinent scope for fact-finding could be national, state-wide, 
or the respective court’s jurisdiction.  What measure of fact-finding is ultimately deemed 
appropriate must depend on the constitutional values at stake.  Very different procedural 
consequences follow depending on the level of fact that courts find to be relevant.  These 
procedural consequences inevitably affect the substantive expression of constitutional rights.  
Finally, the choice made regarding what kinds of facts are relevant under a particular 
constitutional provision will determine the sorts of proof that might be used to find those facts.  
The type of evidence used to prove adjudicative-facts usually differs markedly from the type of 
evidence used to prove review-facts and, moreover, the identity of the respective finder of fact 
changes as well.  The next section takes up the matter of how different kinds of constitutional 
facts might be proven.
C.  Proving Constitutional Facts
Two basic issues are presented by the question of how constitutional facts are to be 
proven.  The first concerns what sort of proof is allowable, or, to use an evidentiary term, 
“admissible,” to demonstrate that the fact is so or is not so.  Terminology from evidence doctrine, 
however, is misleading, since so much proof of constitutional facts comes to the knowledge of 
courts outside of the trial process in which rules of evidence preside.  The second basic issue 
involves what decision-rules courts use to resolve conflicting evidence.  Again, decision-rules, 
such as burdens of production and standards of proof, are readily found in ordinary trial 
procedure, but the highly varied ways in which constitutional facts are employed by courts makes 
the analogy inexact.  Constitutional facts present novel challenges to the traditional procedural 
framework, since they sometimes fit it, sometimes do not, and sometimes fit it and do not fit it at 
the same time.  In many cases, for instance, the same constitutional fact will be the subject of 
proof admitted at trial and proof introduced in an amicus brief.  Evaluation criteria in 
constitutional cases, therefore, might parallel those employed in evidence codes, but they also 
must be applicable more generally to the factual determinations endemic to the Constitution.  In 
addition, although allocating burdens of proof is inherent to all fact-finding, the Court has 
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historically viewed facts categorically in its constitutional analysis, as either true or not true, a 
perspective wholly at odds with modern views of empiricism.  This section considers both the 
question of evidentiary standards and standards of proof.  Once again, the division of facts into 
the categories of rule-, review-, and adjudicative-facts assists in the resolution of these issues.
Yet, before moving on to examine the sources and burdens of proof for the different types 
of constitutional facts, two issues bear emphasis here, since they apply to the establishment of all 
three types of constitutional facts.  The first, mentioned in the previous sections, is that what 
sorts of facts are relevant in particular constitutional contexts is a matter of constitutional 
interpretation.  Constitutional values must be used to determine whether undue burdens are 
measured nationally, on a case-by-case basis, or somewhere in-between, whether claims of 
discrimination under the Eighth Amendment must be specific to the case or can be systemic, or 
whether the effects of segregation are to be measured nationally or school-by-school.  The second 
issue is related to this proposition, in that once the sort of fact having constitutional relevance has 
been established, courts must also determine, as a constitutional matter, the kinds of proof that 
might be adequate to prove or disprove the fact.  In social scientific terms, this issue concerns 
what is referred to as the “operational definition” of the concept having constitutional relevance.  
Legal notions such as competence, intelligence, and cruel and unusual, must be defined 
concretely so that they can be measured for adjudicatory purposes.80  The issue of what must be 
proven in order to meet the constitutional inquiry is a subject of law and a function of 
constitutional interpretation.
80 Operational definitions permit the inter-subjective testing of hypotheses, in that 
they give different researchers (or judges) a concrete idea what abstract concepts mean.  A study 
on jury deliberations, for example, might consider a host of outcome variables, operationally 
defined as, say, verdicts (measured by jury awards in dollars), length of time of deliberations 
(measured in minutes), juror satisfaction (measured by juror responses to a questionnaire), and so 
on.  The basic idea of an operational definition is endemic to all science.  For example, 
meteorologists might measure temperature by use of a thermometer or by “wind-chill.” Wind-
chill combines thermometer readings with wind speed and takes into account physiological 
factors, such as heat loss from the body (i.e., modern heat transfer theory). For an excellent 
discussion of wind chill, including conversion charts, see 
http://www.weather.gov/om/windchill/index.shtml. 
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In Atkins v. Virginia, for example, the Court held that executions of mentally retarded 
criminals constituted cruel and unusual punishment prohibited by the Eighth Amendment.  
Although the Court did not specifically define what qualifies as valid proof of mental retardation, 
it is clear that this will be a central point of contention in subsequent cases.81  The question of 
whether an individual capital defendant is mentally retarded for purposes of an Atkins analysis –
and thereby categorically excluded from the death penalty – is a constitutional fact.  But how 
mental retardation is to be operationally defined must be resolved as a matter of law.  This will 
prove to be difficult, however, since the issue of where to draw a categorical line on I.Q. that 
distinguishes low intelligence from retardation is not a straightforward exercise.  Ideally, the line 
between an un-executable mentally-retarded criminal and an executable low-intelligence criminal 
should be drawn on the basis of the reasons the Atkins Court gave for holding that it was cruel 
and unusual to execute mentally retarded murderers in the first place.  According to Justice 
Stevens’ opinion, these reasons include, among others, that the twin purposes of deterrence and 
retribution do not apply to the mentally deficient in the same way that they apply to those without 
similar intellectual deficiencies.  Unfortunately, research provides little guidance on just how 
mentally deficient a person would have to be for deterrence and retribution not to apply to him or 
her.82
The question, therefore, of how the category of “mental retardation” is to be operationally
defined for Atkins purposes is a constitutional rule, with all of the ambiguity and normative 
considerations that attend these sorts of determinations.83  Rule-facts are likely to be relevant to 
81 See, e.g., In re Bowling, 422 F.3d 434, 436-37 (6th  Cir. 2005) (“Atkins did not set 
forth a definitive rule or procedure for the courts to follow in determining when an offender is 
mentally retarded such that his or her execution would violate the Eighth Amendment. Instead, 
Atkins reserved for the states “the task of developing appropriate ways to enforce the 
constitutional restriction” upon the execution of sentences.”) (quoting Roper, 536 U.S. at 317)).
82 See Atkins, 536 U.S. 304, 350 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“[W]hat scientific analysis 
can possibly show that a mildly retarded individual who commits an exquisite torture-killing is 
‘no more culpable’ than the ‘average’ murder in a hold-up-gone-wrong or a domestic dispute?”).
83 See infra Section II.1.a.
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the delineation of this category and together with normative considerations can contribute to the 
construction of a practicable framework.  Once this category is defined, however, proof regarding 
whether a particular capital defendant is “mentally retarded” is a constitutional adjudicative-fact.
A parallel process must occur with constitutional review-facts, as evidenced by Roper v. 
Simmons.  Following fast upon Atkins, the Roper Court held that executing criminals who 
committed their crimes when they were sixteen or seventeen was unconstitutional.  Roper relied 
on a similar form of analysis to Atkins, in that the Court found that minors were less responsible 
for their actions and less likely to be deterred by the death penalty than adults.  Rather than 
require individual competency assessments, as was essentially the case in Atkins, the Court held 
that the rule applied to all minors, even though some might have reasoning capacities equal to 
those of adults.  In reaching its conclusion that executing those who committed their crimes as 
minors was unconstitutional, the Court cited three factual conclusions that supported the 
decision: surveys of American attitudes toward executing minors, the psychological and 
physiological developmental differences between minors and adults, and surveys of international 
practices on the subject.  Each of these grounds raises constitutional review-facts, the proof of 
which is discussed in this section.  But the kinds of proof that are adequate to prove these facts is 
an issue that must be determined as a matter of law.  For instance, under the Eighth Amendment, 
the Court has repeatedly stated that Americans’ attitudes toward the death penalty is a relevant 
consideration.  The Court, however, operationally defines this factual issue as a matter of state 
legislative practice, as opposed to, say, popular surveys of voters or Americans more generally.84
Thus, that contemporary views of the death penalty are relevant and that these views are 
measured largely by virtue of state legislative practice, are legal considerations determined 
according to the Court’s understanding of the Constitution’s meaning.  Once determined to be 
constitutionally relevant, surveys of state constitutional practice (or international practices, or the 
developmental capacities of minors) become constitutional review-facts that must be found 
84 See Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 311 (1989) (When determining whether a 
punishment is “cruel and unusual” under the evolving standards of decency embraced by the 
Eighth Amendment, the Court has emphasized that state legislation is the “clearest and most 
reliable objective evidence of contemporary values.”)
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according to particular rules of procedure.  This section examines the procedures that might be 
appropriate  for finding constitutional facts, depending on the sort of fact that has been accorded 
constitutional significance.
1.  Proving Constitutional Rule-Facts
Rule-facts are typically the grandest and most amorphous facts found in constitutional 
cases.  The two most common are historical facts associated with original intent and sociological 
facts associated with structural issues surrounding the operation of the Constitution.  Both kinds 
are replete with uncertainty, much of it associated with the difficulty of studying these respective 
subjects.  Evidentiary standards and decision-rules must be responsive to the nature of the proof 
available.  This means that traditional notions surrounding evidence and standards of proof are 
largely inapposite in the case of constitutional rule-facts.  Rule-facts tend to be as much a product 
of aspiration as they are deduced from evidence.
a.  Sources of Proof
Rule-facts are a component of the interpretive process of determining the meaning of 
specific provisions of the Constitution.  They are thus part of the law making process.  As a 
consequence, rule-facts are only tangentially a function of the adversarial process.  Although the 
parties are charged with the responsibility to inform courts about the applicable law, including 
the authorities that support that law, courts independently determine the law’s content.  Courts 
are not restricted to the parties’ views on the Constitution’s meaning, nor are they bound to the 
authorities presented by the parties for determining that meaning.  Just as a judge might retire to 
the library to research a line of cases, he or she might consult “The Federalist” when considering 
what foundational principles underlie the Supremacy Clause.
Rule-facts, therefore, generally do not come to courts’ attention through expert witnesses 
or testimony at trial.  On occasion, perhaps, a trial court might request testimony on a fact that is 
relevant to the definition of a rule, but this is likely to be relatively rare.  More often, factually-
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based supporting arguments for original intent or constitutional structure will be presented in 
briefs or memoranda based on independent research published in articles or books.  As noted, 
judges might also independently consult these sources in an effort to frame or shape doctrine.  
Indeed, a goodly amount of a judge’s extra-judicial reading might involve histories that could 
influence his or her perspectives on constitutional law.  A judge who reads a biography of 
Alexander Hamilton or a history of the New Deal Court might very well apply this new found 
knowledge to his or her constitutional cases.
As a practical matter, rule-facts are complexly intertwined with logical and normative 
arguments.  It will often be hard to say where the empirical argument ends and the normative 
argument begins.  For example, in New York Times v. Sullivan,85 the Court adopted the “actual 
malice” standard for libel actions brought by public officials against critics of their official 
actions.  When applied, this rule requires proof by adjudicative facts, since actual malice requires 
a showing “that the statement was made with ... knowledge that it was false or with reckless 
disregard of whether it was false or not.”86  But the New York Times rule is, itself, based on a 
combination of normative propositions and factual predicates.
Justice Brennan, writing for the Court in New York Times, relied on both historical facts 
and sociological facts to support the new defamation standard.  He argued, for example, that the 
libel standard applied by the lower court was similar to the Sedition Act of 1798, a law 
invalidated “in the court of history” due to the restraints it “imposed upon criticism of 
government and public officials.”87  Additionally, Brennan asserted, because “erroneous 
statement is inevitable in free debate,” even false statements must “be protected if the freedoms 
of expression are to have the ‘breathing space’ that they ‘need ... to survive.’”88 Brennan stated 
85 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
86 Id. at 279-80.
87 Id. at 276.
88 Id. at 271-72 (quoting NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 433 (1963)).
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that the Alabama rule could not be “saved by its allowance of the defense of truth.”  This rule, he 
observed, leads to “self-censorship.”  “[W]ould-be critics of official conduct may be deterred 
from voicing their criticism, even though it is believed to be true and even though it is in fact 
true, because of doubt whether it can be proved in court or fear of the expense of having to do 
so.”89  The Alabama libel rule, the Court concluded, “dampens the vigor and limits the variety of 
public debate.”90  The Free Speech Clause, then, assumes its meaning in part from the historical 
lessons surrounding attempts to suppress expression and the effects of particular rules on human 
behavior.
There are two particularly noteworthy aspects of constitutional rule-facts, as illustrated by 
Justice Brennan’s opinion in New York Times.  The first is, as noted, the seamless character of 
the argument between, on the one hand, statements regarding the normative values inherent in 
the First Amendment – free discourse, debate and dissent – and, on the other hand, the factual 
arguments regarding the history of the Sedition Act or Brennan’s account of the psychology of 
civil libel law and its potential to chill speech.  In terms of evaluating which premises are doing 
the work, one premise cannot be disentangled easily from the others.  As is often true in this 
context, the factual arguments in New York Times are interwoven into the textual and normative 
ones.  
Another characteristic of rule-facts evidenced in New York Times is the virtual total lack 
of supporting authorities for these assertions.  Because of their generally abstract and highly 
complex nature, judges generally feel less compulsion to cite supporting authorities for rule-facts 
than they do for the other kinds of constitutional facts.  Historical facts, particularly those with 
constitutional relevance, often seem to assume mythical qualities.  Many become part of the lore 
of constitutional doctrine, much as George Washington’s cherry tree is an abiding fiction taught 
to generations of school children.  Arguments for a strong reading of the Second Amendment, for 
example, seem to have as much to do with late twentieth-century Hollywood as late eighteenth-
89 Id. at 278-79.
90 Id.
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century Philadelphia.91
b.  Allocating Burdens of Proof
Factual claims surrounding “original intent” occupy the largest niche of constitutional 
rule-facts.  But the task of reliably identifying original intent is beset by several basic challenges, 
some associated with the strain of stating the constitutionally relevant inquiry and others 
concerned with the difficulty of fact-investigation in historical analysis.  As regards the former, 
courts and commentators have never adequately defined the specific issue in original intent that 
is the source of constitutional meaning.92  Indeed, even the question of the initial relevance of 
original intent has been challenged.93  But assuming its relevance, what inquiry is constitutionally 
mandated?  Is it the drafters’ intent?, the ratifiers’ intent?, and what degree of agreement among 
the possible “intenders” is necessary to determine a specific intent?94  Complicating matters 
substantially is the latter challenge, that history as a discipline is rarely able to provide definitive 
proof and is very susceptible to the biases of the age in which it is done.  Although historians
have many powerful methodological tools, the picture they provide usually offers little more than 
a dim perception of a world shrouded in the mists of time.
Similarly, sociological or political science explorations into the structural operation of the 
Constitution are assailed by the complexity of the subject.  Consider, for example, one of the 
perennial structural issues presented by the American Constitution, the question whether small 
republics (i.e., the states) are more likely to be protective of liberty than large republics (i.e., the 
91 See WHOSE RIGHT TO BEAR ARMS DID THE SECOND AMENDMENT PROTECT? (Saul 
Cornell, ed., 2000).
92 See Henry P. Monaghan, Our Perfect Constitution, 56 N.Y.U. L. REV. 353, 360 
(1981).
93 See William Brennan, My Encounters with the Constitution, JUDGES J., Summer 
1987, at 7, 10.
94 See Powell, supra note XX, at 888.
-35-
national government).95  This debate divided Jefferson and Madison in 1787, the Nation in 1861, 
and continues to this day to affect both constitutional doctrine and popular debate.  Debates over 
states’ rights have for some time failed to seriously evaluate Montesquieu’s assertion that “[i]t is 
natural to a republic to have only a small territory, otherwise it cannot long subsist.”96  Alexander 
Hamilton deftly refuted Montesquieu’s relevance to the constitutional debate, observing, “[w]hen 
Montesquieu recommends a small extent for republics, the standards he had in view were of 
dimensions far short of the limits of almost every one of these States.”97  Yet, to this day, and 
based on neither reason nor experience, the perspective associated with Montesquieu remains a 
core stricture of constitutional faith.  Presumably, there is a fact of the matter, but it is likely one 
that is highly complex and contextual, and the tools of social science are unlikely ever to give us 
a definitive answer.  Instead, the facts are known sufficiently enough only to give the opposing 
sides enough ammunition to sustain an argument.  The choice between traditional Federalist 
beliefs in the virtues of a large republic and traditional Anti-Federalist beliefs in States’ rights 
largely depends on differing policy agendas rather than disagreements over natural philosophy or 
political science.
For the most part, the sorts of facts that underlie constitutional rules are as much articles 
of faith as they are matters of scientific investigation.  The concept of burdens of proof do not 
readily apply to such fact-finding, since there is little, if any, quantitative quality to their 
discovery.  The most that can be said is that these facts are known with more or less confidence, 
but the ranges of such confidence are likely to be fairly wide.  Moreover, as noted above, rule-
facts are typically used in conjunction with other authorities, such as textual interpretation and 
95 Martin S. Flaherty, History “Lite” in Modern American Constitutionalism, 95 
COLUM. L. REV. 523, 571 (1995); Symposium, The Republican Civil Tradition: Beyond the 
Republican Revival 97 YALE L.J. 1539, 1558 (1988); see generally, James S. Liebman & 
Brandon L. Garrett, Madisonian Equal Protection, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 837 (2004).
96 BERNARD BAILYN, ED., THE DEBATE ON THE CONSTITUTION, Volume 1, 170-171 
(1990).
97 Alexander Hamilton, John Jay, and James Madison, The Federalist, no. 9, 50 
(Norwalk, Conn.: Easton Press, 1979).
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precedent, and thus rarely have independent significance for the definition of particular doctrine.  
It would make little more sense to apply burdens of proof to historical facts than it would to 
apply such decision-rules to the holdings of precedent.  Defining the Constitution is, at bottom, a 
rhetorical exercise, and although facts are often employed in the process, rule-facts are a 
constituent part of the process of setting the Constitution’s meaning and cannot be well 
understood or effectively evaluated outside of the interpretive enterprise.
2.  Proving Constitutional Review-Facts
Review-facts become relevant under constitutionally-based rules or standards.  They 
share qualities of both rule-facts and adjudicative-facts.  Like the former, they transcend 
individual cases and, once found, have precedential effect.  Like the latter, however, they 
typically can be operationally defined98 and subject to substantial, if not definitive, proof.  Unlike 
rule-facts, review-facts can be taken seriously in constitutional adjudication because they are 
defined largely independently of normative considerations.  With review-facts, there is more 
likely to be a fact-of-the-matter that can be studied by multiple researchers, whose terms can be 
operationally defined, and which is amenable to refutation.  Given their complexity, the role of 
evidentiary standards and standards of proof are especially important when review-facts are in 
dispute.
a.  Sources of Proof
Courts become aware of review-facts in a myriad of ways.  Proof of review-facts is 
introduced through expert testimony, in the briefs and memoranda of the parties and amici, and 
through independent judicial research.  Immediately apparent, given the wide variety of 
pathways, is the range of standards that might be employed in the reception of proof of these 
facts.  At trial, evidence regarding review-facts must overcome the fairly substantial threshold 
provided by rules of admissibility, typically those involving expert testimony.  On appeal, in 
98 See supra notes XX-XX, and accompanying text for a discussion of “operational 
definitions.”
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contrast, courts routinely accept amicus briefs chock-full of factual assertions from interested 
parties who might, or might not, have expertise on the subject.  Relatedly, constitutional review-
facts are introduced at every level of court.  Historically, there has been no practice or tradition 
that review-facts be introduced at trial and survive the rigors of the adversarial process.  Indeed, 
the celebrated Brandeis Brief is an example of the extra-evidentiary admission of constitutional 
review-facts.  In Muller v. Oregon,99 the sociological arguments Brandeis used to justify the 
Oregon law were presented first on appeal.  A certain degree of confusion, therefore, reigns in 
constitutional cases when it comes to proof of review-facts.
Despite the somewhat chaotic situation surrounding review-facts, the state of affairs is 
nothing like the free-for-all that occurs with rule-facts.  Moreover, review-facts merit more 
serious and systematic attention than do rule-facts.  Rule-facts tend to be amorphous and abstract, 
and rarely do the heavy lifting in constitutional interpretation.  Review-facts, in contrast, are 
more concrete, more likely to be amenable to rigorous empirical research, and more often taken 
seriously in constitutional adjudication.  Constitutional cases are replete with review facts.  In 
Barnes v. Glen Theatre100 and City of Erie v. Pap’s AM,101 the Court accepted the proposition 
that nude dancing establishments lead to increased crime, including prostitution, drug abuse, and 
assaults.  Explicitly in Barefoot v. Estelle102 and United States v. Salerno,103 and implicitly in 
Kansas v. Hendricks104 and Kansas v. Crane,105 the Court rejected the proposition that 
psychiatrists and psychologists are unable to adequately predict whether a person will be violent 
99 208 U.S. 412 (1908).
100 501 U.S. 560 (1991).
101 529 U.S. 277, 290-91 (2000).
102 463 U.S. 880, 896 (1983).
103 481 U.S. 739, 751-52 (1987).
104 521 U.S. 346, 358-60 (1997).
105 534 U.S. 407, 411-13 (2002).
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in the future.  In Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition,106 the Court refused to invalidate a 
congressional statute regulating virtual child pornography because of the lack of empirical 
evidence that these materials caused substantial societal harms.107  And the list of such cases 
involving review-facts goes on almost without end.  Given their abundance, one might have 
thought that some procedural guidelines or evaluative guideposts would apply to proof of 
constitutional review-facts.  As of yet, however, there are none.
Less so than rule-facts, and more so than adjudicative-facts, review-facts implicate basic 
constitutional values and effectively establish constitutional boundaries.  In Grutter v. 
Bollinger,108 for example, the Court said that the strict scrutiny test applied to the affirmative 
action program adopted by the University of Michigan’s School of Law.  This test provides “that 
[racial] classifications are constitutional only if they are narrowly tailored to further compelling 
governmental interests.”109  Under this test, courts review both the means and the ends of 
programs classifying by race, and both involve inquiries regarding constitutional facts.  The 
Court, therefore, ostensibly analyzed whether Michigan’s objective was sufficiently compelling 
and whether the means chosen to effectuate that objective were narrowly tailored.
The compelling government interest, the Court stated, was the single justification of 
“obtaining ‘the educational benefits that flow from a diverse student body.’”110 Although the 
Court deferred to the school’s “educational judgment that such diversity is essential to its 
educational mission,”111 it summarized the basis for the factual conclusion that educational 
106 535 U.S. 564 (2002).
107 Id. at 253-54.
108 539 U.S. 306 (2003).
109 Id. at 326.
110 Id. at 327 (quoting Brief for Respondents Bollinger et al. i.).
111 Id. at 328; see discussion supra notes X-X and accompanying test, regarding the 
standard of proof for this factual inquiry.
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benefits flow from a diverse student body.  The district court, for instance, found that “‘cross-
racial understanding’ helps to break down racial stereotypes, and ‘enables [students] to better 
understand persons of different races.’”112 The benefits of diversity mean that “‘classroom 
discussion is livelier, more spirited, and simply more enlightening and interesting” when the 
students have ‘the greatest possible variety of backgrounds.’”113 The Court insisted that the 
educational benefits of diversity “are not theoretical but real.”114  The Court supported this 
assertion by observing that, “[i]n addition to the expert studies and reports entered into evidence 
at trial, numerous studies show that student body diversity promotes learning outcomes, and 
‘better prepares students for an increasingly diverse workforce and society, and better prepares 
them as professionals.’”115 The Court cited an assortment of amicus briefs and scholarly books to 
buttress this conclusion.116
The Grutter Court relied on a variety of authorities to support its finding that Michigan 
reasonably believed that racial diversity promoted educational benefits.117  In Grutter, these 
authorities were introduced through evidence adduced at trial, amicus briefs, and scholarly 
materials.  Presumably, however, while the expert evidence introduced at trial survived some 
112 Id. at 330.
113 Id.
114 Id.
115 Id. (quoting Brief for American Educational Research Association et al. as Amici 
Curiae 3).
116 Id.
117 See also Planned Parenthood Fed’n of Am. v. Ashcroft, 320 F. Supp. 2d 957 
(N.D. Cal.  2004) (granting a permanent injunction to enjoin enforcement of the Partial-Birth 
Abortion Ban Act of 2003 after relying on testimony from eight expert witnesses and an amicus 
brief submitted by the California Medical Association and the San Francisco Medical Society).  
The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s opinion in Planned Parenthood Fed’n of Am. v. 
Gonzales, 2006 WL 229900, at * 13, 20 (9th Cir. filed Jan. 31, 2006) (affirming the district 
court’s decision after relying, in part, on amici, including a brief by the California Medical 
Association). 
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threshold assessment of validity, the other sources of data, so far as the opinion indicates, 
received no similar kind of threshold evaluation.  The question naturally arises, therefore, 
whether evidence of constitutional review-facts should be assessed for validity and, if so, by what 
standards this should be done.
In federal courts, expert evidence is preliminarily assessed under Rule 702 and the 
Court’s decision in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.118 Daubert held that trial 
courts are gatekeepers and must be persuaded by a preponderance of the evidence that the basis 
for expert opinion is reliable and valid before it can be admitted.  As a procedural matter, 
however, it would be impractical to apply Daubert to proof of constitutional review-facts.  
Despite some justices’ lament that constitutional facts should undergo the scrutiny of the 
adversarial process,119 this is an unrealistic and unhelpful perspective.  First of all, because 
constitutional review-facts transcend any single litigation, and thus have precedential import, the 
development of a factual record cannot be left to the parties.  An attorney’s failure to adequately 
develop the factual record in an ordinary dispute only affects his or her client’s matter.  Such a 
failure in constitutional litigation potentially affects a multitude of cases.  The Court cannot be 
limited to the record before it when determining constitutional review-facts.  If amici were not 
readily available to supply evidence regarding review-facts, the Court would be obligated to 
conduct its own independent research.  In this sense, questions regarding review-facts bear some 
resemblance to questions surrounding the correct legal standard.  Just as no court would defer to 
the parties to say what the law is, no court should rely on the parties exclusively to say what the 
review-facts are.
118 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
119 See, e.g., Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 457 (1995) (Scalia, J., dissenting) 
(criticizing the majority for “render[ing] new findings of fact and judgments of credibility 
appropriate to a trial court of original jurisdiction”); Iron Arrow Honor Soc. v. Heckler, 464 U.S. 
67, 73 (1983) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (writing that “the issue of mootness [was] sufficiently 
dependent on uncertain factual issues,” after the majority weighed the significance of a document 
on its own in finding the case moot).
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Although Daubert as a rule of evidence does not ordinarily apply to proof of 
constitutional review-facts, the core principles of that decision can offer some guidance to 
assessing the methodological bases of such proof.  In short, Daubert stands for the proposition 
that the probative value of expert evidence is proportionate to the quality and quantity of the data 
that support it.  In the case of scientific evidence, for instance, Daubert held that expert opinions 
based on research that was inadequately tested, that had high or unknown error rates, that had not 
been subjected to peer review or been published, and that had failed to gain general acceptance in 
its particular field, was likely to have little validity and thus low evidentiary reliability.  But the 
core principle of Daubert extends to all fact-based experts, not just scientists.  Under Daubert
and subsequent cases, all experts must show that their opinions are based on “good grounds.”120
The mere assertion of “years of experience,” or what the Court has referred to as the “ipse dixit” 
of the expert,121 is not alone sufficient to verify expert opinion.
Daubert largely incorporates the critical perspective associated with the methods of 
scientific investigation.  This approach should inform judicial reception of evidence regarding 
constitutional review-facts.  Judges should measure empirical claims in accordance with the 
methods on which these claims are based.  Invariably, knowledge about the empirical world will 
be known with greater or lesser confidence.  And the more complex the phenomenon, the more 
difficult it will be to study.  Indeed, often, if not more often than not, the complex phenomena 
relevant in constitutional cases will be largely beyond the methodological abilities of scientists.  
When this is so, the normative principles of the Constitution must be consulted in order to 
allocate the risk of error.  In short, the Constitution establishes rules of decision for fact-based 
inquiries.  For example, the constitutionality of a law prohibiting virtual child pornography 
depends, in part, on the factual question of whether such materials contribute to violence against 
children, a subject on which there is little evidence.  In Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition,122 the 
120 Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 157 (1999).
121 General Electric Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136, 146 (1997).
122 535 U.S. 234 (2002)
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Court invalidated the statute proscribing virtual child pornography on the basis that the 
government had failed to adduce evidence supporting its empirical claims.123  If the government 
had produced such evidence, it should have been evaluated under a Daubert-like inquiry.  Such 
inquiries must be guided by burdens of proof that correspond to the constitutional values at stake.  
As was true in Free Speech Coalition, if no evidence is forthcoming, the party that bears the 
burden of proof loses.
b.  Allocating Burdens of Proof
The basic problem inherent in the court’s current approach to finding constitutional 
review-facts is its ad hoc nature.  Although, as noted, the Court oftentimes speaks in terms of 
“rational basis review” and “strict scrutiny,” it virtually never specifies what burdens of proof 
apply to the fact-finding that must occur under these standards.  Constitutional-review facts and 
constitutional-adjudicative facts, by definition, are relevant under particular constitutional rules.  
Part of the explication of any constitutional rule should include a statement of which party – the 
challenger or the State – has the burden of proof and at what level of proof that burden must be 
met.
Given the enormity of the task and the limited space available here, I can only introduce 
the idea of incorporating evidentiary burdens of proof into constitutional adjudication.124  But the 
core insight is clear and should be relatively easily implemented.  Consider, for example, the 
Court’s “undue burden” standard, discussed above, which was first set forth in its modern form 
by a plurality of the Court in Planned Parenthood v. Casey125 and later applied by a majority in 
Stenberg v. Carhart.  Casey described the undue burden test as follows:
Numerous forms of state regulation might have the incidental effect of increasing the cost 
or decreasing the availability of medical care, whether for abortion or any other medical 
123 Id. at 253-54.
124 [Identifying footnote removed]
125 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
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procedure.  The fact that a law which serves a valid purpose, one not designed to strike at 
the right itself, has the incidental effect of making it more difficult or more expensive to 
procure an abortion cannot be enough to invalidate it.  Only where state regulation 
imposes an undue burden on a woman’s ability to make this decision does the power of 
the state reach into the heart of the liberty protected by the Due Process Clause.126
According to the opinion jointly authored by Justices O’Connor, Kennedy, and Souter, “[a] 
finding of an undue burden is a shorthand for the conclusion that a state regulation has the 
purpose or effect of placing a substantial obstacle in the path of a woman seeking an abortion of 
a nonviable fetus.”127  The undue burden test as formulated, and as applied by the joint opinion in 
Casey, is primarily fact-based.  In effect, the undue burden test strikes a balance between 
individual liberty and government interests in the definition of the rule, but fails to explain how 
that rule should be applied in concrete cases.
Two provisions of the Pennsylvania law illustrate the confusion surrounding the 
application of the undue burden test.  The Pennsylvania law, among other things, imposed a 24-
hour waiting period and contained a spousal notification provision.128  The joint opinion upheld 
the former and invalidated the latter.  Yet, it appears that substantial proof existed indicating that 
the two provisions were burdensome, thus casting doubt on the constitutionality of both of them.  
Indeed, the district court found that the 24-hour waiting provision “increas[ed] the cost and risk 
of abortions”129 and was “particularly burdensome,”130 and, additionally, found that spousal 
notification would significantly burden the basic right of reproductive choice among some 
women.
126 Id. at 874.
127 Id. at 877.
128 Casey, 505 U.S. at 844-45.
129 Id. at 886 (quoting Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 744 F.Supp. 1323, 1378 
(E.D.Pa. 1990)).
130 Id.
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The joint opinion in Casey concluded that the spousal notification provision was unduly 
burdensome but that the evidence did not support a similar conclusion regarding the 24-hour 
waiting requirement.  But the opinion failed to explain its reasons for believing that one 
provision was unduly burdensome while the other was not.  As regards the 24-hour waiting 
provision, the joint opinion simply stated, “on the record before us, ... we are not convinced that 
the 24-hour waiting period constitutes an undue burden.”131  In contrast, the joint opinion 
adopted the factual findings of the district court in striking down the spousal notification 
provision.  Indeed, the joint opinion went beyond the findings of the district court and cited 
research studies that were not in the record.132  The joint opinion concluded that “[t]he spousal 
notification requirement ... does not merely make abortions a little more difficult or expensive to 
obtain; for many women, it will impose a substantial obstacle.”133
A large part of the ambiguity associated with constitutional adjudication stems from the 
Court’s refusal to recognize the empirical component of constitutional review-facts and its failure 
to allocate responsibility for demonstrating review-facts having constitutional import.  Under the 
Commerce Clause, for instance, the Court has long insisted that Congress need not demonstrate 
that a challenged regulation “substantially affects interstate commerce,” though it has suggested 
that such proof might be of assistance to the Court’s determination.134  Recent cases, however, 
indicate a large measure of ambiguity over whether Congress bears any burden of proof in these 
cases, or, if so, what the nature of that burden is.  In United States v. Lopez,135 the Court stated 
131 Id. at 887.
132 Id. at 992 n.6 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
133 Id. at 893-94.
134 See Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294, 299 (1964) (Court noted that, “while 
no formal findings were made [by Congress], which of course is not necessary, it is well that we 
make mention of the testimony to determine whether the Act is a reasonable and appropriate 
means [to regulate commerce].”); Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 146, 156 (1971) (“We have 
mentioned [the] economic, financial, and social setting of the problem as revealed to Congress.  
We do so not to infer that Congress need make particularized findings in order to legislate.”).
135 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
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that it agreed “that Congress normally is not required to make formal findings as to the 
substantial burdens that an activity has on interstate commerce.”136  The Court failed to say what 
circumstances might not qualify as “normal.”  Moreover, the Court stated cryptically that, “to the 
extent that congressional findings would enable us to evaluate the legislative judgment that the 
activity in question substantially affected interstate commerce, even though no substantial effect 
was visible to the naked eye, they are lacking [here].”137  Justice Breyer, in dissent, offered a 
factual basis for Congress’ judgment that guns in school zones substantially affect interstate 
commerce.  It is unclear, however, whether if Congress had forwarded the justification identified 
by Breyer it would have made any difference.  More to the point, it is unclear what standard of 
proof applies in Commerce Clause cases after Lopez.138
3.  Proving Constitutional Adjudicative-Facts
Adjudicative facts are, in many respects, the most anomalous sort of facts in 
constitutional cases.  On the one hand, they are seemingly the most manageable kinds of facts.  
They are readily recognized, since they are case-specific, and ostensibly are subject to all of the 
ordinary rules of procedure and evidence.  Also, because they are case-specific, they do not 
appear to have many precedential consequences.  On the other hand, they can be difficult to 
manage and can, in fact, be complex and extraordinary.  Most difficult is the initial question 
whether the relevant inquiry should be at the adjudicative-fact or legislative-fact level (whether 
review- or rule-fact).  For example, in New York v. Ferber,139 the Court held that the deleterious 
136 Id. at 560.
137 Id.
138 Compare United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000) (rejecting extensive 
congressional findings that violence against women, in the aggregate, substantially affects 
interstate commerce) with Gonzales v. Raich, 125 S.Ct. 2195 (2005) (stating that the test is not 
whether the questioned activity, in the aggregate, actually substantially affects interstate 
commerce, but whether there exists a “rational basis” for Congress to conclude that there is such 
a nexus).
139 458 U.S. 747 (1982).
-46-
consequences that were suffered by children who appeared in child pornography were sufficient 
to justify the proscription of this entire class of speech.  Although not described in such terms, 
the physical and psychological consequences of child pornography for the children involved in it 
were treated as constitutional review-facts in Ferber.  The Ferber Court cited “the legislative 
judgment that the use of children as subjects of pornographic materials is harmful to the 
physiological, emotional, and mental health of the [child].”140  In contrast, and in dissent, Justice 
Brennan argued that the appropriate level of analysis should be case-specific, for allowing 
prohibitions of all child pornography swept too broadly and affected materials having scientific, 
literary, or artistic value.  Justice Brennan preferred the use of a Miller- styled test, which would 
have made the relevant constitutional fact adjudicative, as is the case for materials alleged to be 
obscene.
Although constitutional adjudicative-facts have no formal effect as precedent, they are 
nonetheless likely to reverberate throughout subsequent cases.  They often establish 
constitutional boundaries and effectively serve as “cases-in-point” for the limits or allowances of 
constitutional doctrine.  In addition, in the individual cases in which they are found, they 
invariably affect constitutional rights and values.  As a consequence of this greater constitutional 
role, constitutional adjudicative-facts are generally understood as raising mixed questions of fact 
and law and thus garner substantially more judicial attention than run-of-the-mill adjudicative-
facts.141
a. Sources of Proof
Adjudicative-facts, because they are case-specific, normally are proven by the testimony 
of lay or expert witnesses.  There is little of significant controversy surrounding these facts, since 
140 Id. at 758.
141 See Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of United States, 466 U.S. 485 (1984); see 
generally Monaghan, supra note XX, at 238 (“We commonly assume that there is something 
distinctive about judicial review of the adjudicative facts decisive of any constitutional claim.”).
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courts are usually content to allow ordinary rules of evidence and procedure to apply to them.  
When disputed in court, rules of evidence apply to proffered testimony, writings, or other 
materials.  There are, however, at least two special situations that arise fairly commonly 
concerning constitutional adjudicative-facts that merit some attention.  First, rules of evidence 
are sometimes challenged on the basis that they violate the Constitution.  And second, the 
Constitution might be interpreted to require certain kinds of proof, such as expert testimony over 
that of lay testimony.
Like all statutes, rules of evidence must conform to constitutional guarantees.  Evidence 
codes apply to all adjudicative facts, so there is an Escher-like quality to factual challenges to the 
constitutionality of a rule of evidence.  Consider, for example, the cases of Rock v. Arkansas142
and United States v. Scheffer.143  These two cases raised similar Sixth Amendment issues, but 
were resolved quite differently, both as a substantive matter and in regard to the Court’s 
treatment of the constitutional facts implicated in the cases.  In Scheffer, the defendant claimed 
that the United States military’s per se rule excluding polygraph evidence violated his Sixth 
Amendment right to present a defense.144  The defendant in Scheffer relied on Rock, in which the 
Court had stated that rules of evidence “may not be arbitrary or disproportionate to the purposes 
they are designed to serve.”145  Based on this admonition, the Rock Court invalidated the 
Arkansas per se rule prohibiting the admission of hypnotically refreshed testimony.  The Court 
concluded that a “State’s legitimate interest in barring unreliable evidence does not extend to per 
se exclusions that may be reliable in an individual case.”146  The Scheffer Court, however, found 
the per se rule excluding polygraphs not to be arbitrary, since it was designed to exclude 
unreliable evidence.  The Court found that “there is simply no consensus that polygraph evidence 
142 483 U.S. 44 (1987).
143 523 U.S. 303 (1998).
144 523 U.S. at 307 n.3.
145 Rock, 483 U.S. at 61.
146 Id.
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is reliable.”147  Indeed, the Court stated, “[t]o this day, the scientific community remains 
extremely polarized about the reliability of polygraph techniques.”148  Therefore, the Court 
apparently concluded that hypnotically refreshed recall was sufficiently reliable in enough cases 
to preclude a per se rule, but polygraph evidence was not.149  In both cases, the Court evaluated 
the disputed evidence as a constitutional review-fact, since the sometimes reliability of 
hypnotically refreshed recall and the less dependable polygraph test were considered as a general 
matter, given the state of the art of scientific research.  In Rock, however, the Court’s resolution 
created an adjudicative-fact inquiry.  As the Rock Court made clear, although the per se rule was 
unconstitutional, hypnotically refreshed recall could still be excluded on a case-by-case basis 
when the refreshed testimony was unreliable.150
The Constitution also affects evidentiary practice when the Court determines whether a 
particular provision requires a certain kind of proof.  For example, in ordinary commitment 
proceedings, the state must prove, among other things, that the defendant is mentally ill.  In 
Addington v. Texas,151 the Court observed that “[t]here may be factual issues to resolve in a 
commitment proceeding, but the factual aspects represent only the beginning of the inquiry.”152
The Court added, “[w]hether the individual is mentally ill and dangerous to himself or others and 
is in need of confined therapy turns on the meaning of the facts which must be interpreted by 
expert psychiatrists and psychologists.”153  Although the Court has yet to specifically say, it 
147 Scheffer, 523 U.S. at 309.
148 Id. at 309-10.
149 Another important difference between Rock and Scheffer was that the former 
involved the defendant’ own testimony while the latter involved an expert witness testifying for 
the defendant.  As a constitutional matter, per se exclusion of the defendant’s own testimony may 
be a more serious matter than excluding one of the defendant’s witnesses.
150 483 U.S. 44 (1987).
151 441 U.S. 418 (1979).
152 Id. at 429.
153 Id.
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would appear that the testimony of a mental health expert would be constitutionally necessary in 
order to involuntarily commit someone under Addington.  In capital sentencing, however, the 
Court has expressly accepted lay persons’ ability to predict dangerousness,154 despite substantial 
evidence that such predictions of violence are prone to error even when done by expert 
psychiatrists and psychologists155
b.  Allocating Burdens of Proof
A central orienting procedural mechanism for adjudicative facts is the standard of proof.  
Burdens of proof apportion the costs of making mistakes to the parties based on the social and 
policy consequences associated with one kind of mistake or another.  As the Court explained in 
Addington v. Texas,156 the “standard serves to allocate the risk of error between the litigants and 
to indicate the relative importance attached to the ultimate decision.”157  The Addington Court 
said that at one end of the spectrum are ordinary civil cases involving monetary disputes between 
private parties.  In these cases, “society has a minimal concern with the outcome, [so] the 
plaintiffs’ burden of proof is a mere preponderance of the evidence.”158  At the other end of the 
spectrum, in criminal cases, “the interests of the defendant are of such magnitude that historically 
... they have been protected by standards of proof designed to exclude as nearly as possible the 
likelihood of an erroneous judgment.”159  According to the Court, “[t]his is accomplished by 
requiring under the Due Process Clause that the state prove the guilt of an accused beyond a 
154 Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262 (1976).
155 In Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880 (1983), the Court largely accepted the insight 
that expert predictions of future violence are not reliable.  The Court, however, noted absurdly 
that “[n]either petitioner nor the [American Psychiatric] Association suggests that psychiatrists 
are always wrong with respect to future dangerousness, only most of the time.”  Id. at 901.
156 441 U.S. 418 (1979).
157 Id. at 423.
158 Id.
159 Id.
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reasonable doubt.”160  Thus, “[i]n the administration of criminal justice, our society imposes 
almost the entire risk of error upon itself.”161
In Addington, the Court considered what standard of proof applies when a state seeks to 
involuntarily commit a person to a mental hospital for an indefinite period.  The Court initially 
observed that commitment hearings, which pose “a significant deprivation of liberty,” require a 
standard greater than a preponderance of the evidence.  At the same time, the Court found that 
the criminal standard of proof beyond a reasonable doubt was not appropriate in ordinary civil 
commitment cases.  Instead, it held that an intermediate standard, a clear and convincing 
evidence requirement, was best tailored to the costs of error in this area.162  The Court offered 
several reasons for this conclusion.  First, following an involuntary commitment, the continuing 
involvement of professionals, family, and friends in the person’s treatment would provide 
opportunities for errors to be corrected.  Second, making an error that permits a mentally ill 
person to live in the general community is not necessarily good for that person: “It cannot be said 
... that it is much better for a mentally ill person to ‘go free’ than for a mentally normal person to 
be committed.”163  And third, the Court observed, “[g]iven the lack of certainty and the fallibility 
of psychiatric diagnoses, there is a serious question as to whether a state could ever prove beyond 
a reasonable doubt that an individual is both mentally ill and likely to be violent.”164  The 
Addington Court, therefore, explicitly weighed the costs and benefits associated with the risks of 
erroneous commitments (i.e., false positives) and erroneous releases (i.e., false negatives), and 
concluded that proof somewhat greater than preponderance but somewhat less than beyond a 
reasonable doubt was constitutionally mandated.  Whatever one thinks of Addington’s bottom 
160 Id. at 424.
161 Id. at 423-24.
162 In the lexicon of this Article, although the issues of mental illness and likelihood 
of future violence are adjudicative facts, the choice of the clear and convincing evidence standard 
for civil commitments involves rule-facts. 
163 Id. at 430.
164 Id.
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line, the Court’s candidness and the clarity it produces for future cases should be applauded.
III. JUDICIAL REVIEW OF CONSTITUTIONAL FACT-FINDING
As demonstrated in the previous sections, facts are endemic to the entire enterprise of 
constitutional decision making.  Constitutional facts are found up, down, and across the 
judiciary’s hierarchical structure.  By far the most traditional understanding of constitutional facts 
involves the bottom-up process whereby trial courts receive evidence regarding disputed facts 
and this evidence becomes part of the record on appeal.  This is only a small part of the overall 
picture, however, since facts come into the legal process at many different points, including such 
common avenues as the briefs of the parties and amici.  Moreover, facts do not merely percolate 
up through the judiciary, but they regularly trickle down from above.  In particular, since 
constitutional facts are intrinsic to both the rules themselves and their application to specific 
cases, they become part of the doctrine that is set forth by higher courts.  This section considers 
the dynamics of constitutional fact-finding first from the bottom up and then from the top down.
A.  Facts Found by Lower Courts
Constitutional facts are not merely the province of courts, but are regularly found by 
decision makers across the entire apparatus of government.  Police officers make judgments 
about what constitutes suspicious behavior before making a stop, university administrators assess 
the empirical benefits of diversity in establishing affirmative action programs, and state 
legislatures considering legislation mandating the teaching of “intelligent design” might examine 
the pedagogical benefits that come from teaching it together with the theory of evolution.  
Virtually every decision having constitutional import is accompanied by findings of fact.  Since 
courts are the ultimate determiners of what the law is, they are obligated to review the factual 
findings that either implicitly or explicitly support decisions that implicate constitutional values.  
This raises the important question of how much deference a particular court owes to another 
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institution’s or another court’s constitutional fact-finding.  This question arises when courts 
review the fact-finding of juries, legislatures and administrative agencies.  It also arises when 
appellate courts review lower court fact-finding as well as when lower courts apply higher court 
precedents premised on those courts’ factual findings.  In general, a particular court’s obligation 
to defer to another body’s fact-finding depends on two things, first, the constitutional relationship 
between the court and that body, and, second, the constitutional import of the particular finding.  
In this section, I consider the judiciary’s constitutional obligations regarding both finding facts 
and reviewing facts found elsewhere.165
1.  Judicial Review of Constitutional Facts Found at Trial
At trial, constitutional facts are found by either the trial judge or jury.  The jury’s 
obligations under the Constitution are ordinarily limited to adjudicative facts, since rule- and 
review-facts implicate broad policy matters that fall outside of the jury’s charge.166  But 
constitutional adjudicative-facts also implicate policy matters, since their determination affects 
the exercise of individual rights or the boundaries of constitutional doctrine.  An adjudicative fact 
determination of intentional discrimination or obscenity effectively establishes the content of the 
respective constitutional provision.  This suggests that courts should uniformly apply a stringent 
standard of review for all constitutional facts found at the trial level, since they all implicate basic 
constitutional rights or values.  And this is uncontroversially the rule with regard to 
165 Space prohibits consideration of all the contexts in which courts might review 
constitutional fact-based decisions by non-judicial government actors.  Examples of contexts 
worthy of such consideration, but beyond the scope of this article, are constitutionally relevant 
facts found by federal and state agencies, police officers, municipal officials and state 
legislatures.  Section III.B. considers judicial review of Congress’ constitutional fact-finding.
166 Although relatively rare, juries are sometimes charged with finding constitutional 
review-facts.  Under the Miller test, for example, juries must decide, among other things, 
“whether the work, taken as a whole, lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value.”  
Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973).  See also City of Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes, 
526 U.S. 687, 721 (1999) (Not improper, under § 1983, for a jury to determine “whether a land-
use decision substantially advances legitimate public interests within the meaning of [the 
Court’s] regulatory takings doctrine.”).
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constitutional-rule and constitutional-review facts.167  This section, therefore, focuses on the 
thornier issue of judicial review of constitutional adjudicative-facts found by juries. 
2.  Juries Within the Constitutional Structure
At least two propositions argue for greater deferential review of adjudicative facts found 
by juries, and neither is ultimately persuasive in constitutional cases.  The first involves the 
special place held by juries in the constitutional framework.  Since juries are creatures of the 
Constitution itself, they should perhaps receive deference due to their peculiar role in 
constitutional adjudication.  The second proposition is applicable whether the constitutional 
adjudicative-facts are found by judge or jury and is a shibboleth of evidence law: because 
appellate courts lack the benefit of seeing witnesses first-hand and thus are unable to judge their 
credibility, they should defer to trial court factual findings.  Thus, for example, under New York 
Times v. Sullivan, determining whether a false statement was made “with actual malice” is likely 
to turn on credibility judgments that the trier of fact is uniquely situated to evaluate.  In this 
section, I consider these two issues and conclude that neither provides a convincing basis for 
adopting a deferential standard of review for constitutional adjudicative-facts found at trial.
a. Juries and constitutional values
The Sixth and Seventh Amendments guarantee the right to a jury trial in criminal and 
civil cases, respectively.  In most civil and criminal litigation, the jury (or, if no jury, the judge) 
ordinarily finds adjudicative facts.  Procedural rules, including in particular state and federal 
rules of evidence and procedure, apply to adjudicative fact-finding.  Outside of constitutional 
167 The most straightforward context for considering judicial power to review 
constitutional facts is when appellate courts review the legislative fact-finding of lower courts.  
This doctrine flows naturally from an operating premise that guides all constitutional 
adjudication.  Constitutional rule- and review-facts shape the scope and depth of constitutional 
provisions and thus superior courts cannot be limited to the findings of fact of inferior courts.  
When the pertinent factual issue transcends a particular case, higher courts cannot be bound by 
lower court findings, since the lower courts might have come to different conclusions regarding 
the same facts.  See Lockhart v. McCree, 476 U.S. 162, 168 n.3 (1986) (citing Dunagin v. City of 
Oxford, 718 F.2d 738, 748 n.8 (5th Cir. 1983)(en banc) (plurality opinion of Reavley, J.).
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cases, higher courts typically defer to the fact-finding from below, and this approach is codified 
in federal practice.168  Given their constitutional status and this traditional appellate deference, it 
might be assumed that juries would receive comparable respect in constitutional cases.  But the 
underlying rationale for the jury system and its historical purposes put it at odds with basic 
constitutional principles.  A jury’s primary role is to represent the community from which its 
members are drawn.  In constitutional cases, however, this role comes in conflict with the 
Constitution’s protection of individual rights.  As an essentially majoritarian institution, the 
jury’s role clashes with the countermajoritarian values guaranteed by the Constitution.
The jury is generally thought, in theory if not in practice, to be a cross-section of the 
community whose members bring their experience and commonsense to the application of the 
law.169 Jurors are the neighbors and peers of the accused in criminal cases and the disputants in 
civil cases.  They bring the larger community’s perspective into the courtroom.170  Jurors 
represent mainstream society.  This grounding in the knowledge of the community permits jurors 
to bring a practical realism to particular cases and to soften the law’s application if it proves too 
rigid.  The jury represents the public and while it may carry out this representation imperfectly, 
its verdicts are usually accepted as legitimate largely on this basis.
Because of this identification with the public at-large, juries – and jurors – mostly are not 
held accountable by the public for their decisions.  Jurors melt back into the community when 
168 FED. R. CIV. PROC. 52(a).
169 See Thiel v. Southern Pacific Co., 328 U.S. 217, 220 (1946) (“The American 
tradition of trial by jury, considered in connection with either criminal or civil proceedings, 
necessarily contemplates an impartial jury drawn from a cross-section of the community.”).  See
also Oliver Wendell Holmes, Law in Science and Science in Law, 12 HARV. L. REV. 443, 459-60 
(1899) (In negligence actions, Holmes observed, jurors “will introduce into their verdict a certain 
amount ... of popular prejudice, and thus keep the administration of the law in accord with the 
wishes and feelings of the community.”).
170 See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 181 (1976) (quoting Witherspoon v. Illinois, 
391 U.S. 510, 519, n.15 (1968) (Juries “‘maintain a link between contemporary values and the 
penal system.’”).
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they have finished their service.  If a verdict is condemned for some reason, it is the institution 
that ordinarily bears responsibility.  Public reaction to perceived juror abuses are almost never 
directed at particular jurors, but rather at the system as a whole.171  Brief reflection, of course, 
reveals the importance of the individual characteristics of those who compose juries.  Indeed, an 
entire industry – based upon state of the art social science – has grown around the belief that 
jurors’ predilections affect jury verdicts.172  Yet, nonetheless, the jury as an institution remains 
venerated and is widely thought to produce fair and reasonable outcomes.
But many of the reasons that underlie the use of juries in ordinary proceedings are in 
tension with their use in constitutional cases.  In virtually all instances in which juries are used to 
decide constitutional adjudicative facts, the fundamental liberties and protections of the Bill of 
Rights and Fourteenth Amendment are involved.  These provisions largely enforce counter-
majoritarian values.  The jury, in contrast, is primarily a majoritarian institution.  The virtues 
associated with the representativeness of jurors has little to recommend it in the task of enforcing 
basic individual liberties.  The Bill of Rights is a bulwark against potential majoritarian tyranny.  
Because the jury represents values associated with the political majority, it cannot be fully 
entrusted with protection of the values inherent in the Bill of Rights.
Yet, at the same time, juries in popular literature and numerous historical examples 
operate as defenders of liberty against government tyranny.173  Juries sometimes act in counter-
171 Niki Kuckes, The Useful, Dangerous Fiction of Grand Jury Independence, 41 
AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1, 2 (2004) (writing that “the disconnect between the rhetoric and reality of 
the grand jury is not a coincidence, or a historical vestige, but a central and important feature of 
the modern federal criminal justice system”).
172 See generally Shari Seidman Diamond, Truth, the Jury, and the Adversarial 
System: Truth, Justice, and the Jury, 26 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 143 (2003); Symposium, The 
Selection and Function of the Modern Jury: Jurors’ Attitudes About Civil Litigation and the Size 
of Damage Awards, 40 AM. U.L. REV. 805 (1991).
173 See generally Kaimipono David Wenger & David A. Hoffman, Nullificatory 
Juries, 2003 WIS. L. REV. 1115; David A. Pepper, Nullifying History: Modern- Day Misuse of the 
Right to Decide the Law, 50 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 599 (2000).
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majoritarian ways and, presumably, in defense of individual liberty.  When doing so, however, 
juries do not shed their majoritarian identity.  In effect, juries check and balance the majoritarian 
decision making of the legislative and executive branches of government much as those branches 
check one another.  Juries remain an essentially democratic institution.  Indeed, although juries 
have always had the inherent power of nullification, this power is neither officially sanctioned 
nor generally acclaimed when it is used.  Jurors take an oath to apply the law faithfully and are 
considered to have failed that obligation if they act contrary to its dictates.  While it is true that a 
juror’s responsibility to uphold the law naturally includes fidelity to the Constitution, this does 
not affect the analysis in any substantial way.  Legislators also take an oath to uphold the 
Constitution.  Yet the courts have the responsibility to review legislative actions to ensure that 
they conform to the Constitution.
Arguably, jury issues that arise under the Sixth Amendment are fundamentally different 
from those typically arising under the Seventh Amendment.  Under the Sixth Amendment, juries 
are charged with finding facts in the process of applying popularly enacted laws.  In these cases, 
such as New York Times’ actual malice standard or Miller’s test for community standards of 
decency, the jury sets constitutional limits as a result of its fact-finding.  Under the Seventh 
Amendment, in contrast, the government is likely to be the defendant and the question presented 
is whether its actions are constitutional.  Takings cases and claims of intentional discrimination 
under the Equal Protection Clause provide ready examples.  Under the Sixth Amendment, the 
constitutional issue, at least from the jury’s perspective, mainly will be implicit, whereas the 
constitutional query will be front and center in Seventh Amendment cases.  Moreover, juries in 
Sixth Amendment cases are clearly agents of the government in applying the laws of the land, 
whereas they are charged with judging the government’s actions when operating under the 
Seventh Amendment.
Although these differences are not unimportant, and in individual cases might influence a 
court’s readiness to agree with a jury’s fact-finding, they do not affect the fundamental analysis 
here.  Whether arising in criminal cases under the Sixth Amendment or civil cases under the 
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Seventh Amendment, the jury embodies majoritarian values in a process designed to guarantee 
individual rights.
Juries, therefore, like the other representative institutions of government, must be subject 
to plenary review by the courts when basic liberties are implicated.  Indeed, in many 
constitutional contexts, this independent review has the virtue of operating structurally in a 
rights-protective fashion.  For example, in a criminal obscenity case, two verdicts are possible.  If 
the jury acquits, either because it did not find the material obscene or believed that the obscenity 
laws were too invasive of free speech, there is no review.  A jury decision that is rights protective 
– or even overly protective – must stand.  On the other hand, if a jury convicts on the obscenity 
charge, its decision is subject to independent review by the courts.174  Because courts are the final 
arbiters of the meaning of the Constitution and thus the ultimate guarantors of the counter-
majoritarian values inherent in the Bill of Rights, they must review convictions to ensure that 
they conform with constitutional guarantees.
In civil cases, as well, judges must independently review jury determinations of 
constitutional facts.  The reasons for this exacting review parallel those in the criminal context.  
Just as in criminal cases, burdensome civil verdicts can chill the exercise of fundamental rights.  
Indeed, civil litigation, with its lesser burdens of proof and wide exposure to potentially large 
numbers of litigants, leaves the calculation whether to engage in marginal constitutional activities 
difficult to make.  The uncertainties and vagaries of civil litigation can lead to the chilling of 
activities well within constitutionally protected zones.  Unlike in criminal cases, courts have the 
power to review verdicts that are either protective or unprotective of basic liberties.  It is possible 
to imagine a standard in civil cases that parallels the one in criminal cases.  In effect, this would 
constitute a one-way ratchet, resulting in deferential review of rights-protective decisions and de 
novo review when basic liberties are endangered.  But this ignores the other side of the 
constitutional equation.  A court’s basic task when interpreting constitutional guarantees is 
defining the boundary between the legitimate power of the majority to govern as it deems fit and 
174 Bose, 466 U.S. 485 (1984).
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the inalienable rights of individuals to sometimes be let alone.  Jury verdicts that over-protect 
liberties tread upon the inherent right of the majority to govern as it pleases.  In criminal cases, 
the constitutional balance is set in a way that prefers that any errors redound to the benefit of the 
accused, even at some cost to the majority’s sovereignty.  In civil cases, however, the calculus is 
different.  Judges must ensure that civil juries do not find facts in a way that under-protects 
individual rights or in a way that under-protects majoritarian will and legitimate government 
interests.175
b.  Judging credibility of witnesses
One of the inveterate principles of modern evidence law is that appellate courts owe 
deference to the fact-finding of lower courts because triers of fact have the opportunity to observe 
witnesses and thereby evaluate the credibility of their testimony.176  Although little research data 
are available to demonstrate the validity of this venerable practice,177 it is a firmly believed truth 
of trial and appellate procedure.  But even if it is not entirely true, or at least not as true as most 
courts and scholars believe, this assumption nevertheless has cash value.  Its value, however, is 
largely limited to ordinary litigation.  In constitutional cases, a rule of deference is not worth the 
costs it imposes on basic liberties.
In ordinary litigation, a combination of factors argue in favor of an appellate standard of 
deference to lower court fact-finding.  As an initial matter, a large proportion of adjudicative 
facts do not recur in other cases and so most adjudicative-fact fact-finding has limited, if any, 
175 See Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 148 (1983) (reversing a finding in favor of a 
First Amendment claimant, noting that the question whether the speech was protected or not was 
a question of law.).
176 See James P. Timony, Demeanor Credibility, 49 CATHOLIC UNIV. L. REV. 903 
(2000).
177 Social science research casts some doubt over the value of demeanor evidence in 
detecting deception.  See ALDERT VRIJ, DETECTING LIES AND DECEIT (2000); see generally Roger 
C. Park, Empirical Evaluation of the Hearsay Rule, in Peter Mirfield & Roger Smith, Ed., 
ESSAYS FOR COLIN TAPPER, 91-106 (LexisNexis UK 2003)).
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precedential force.  Questions such as whether the light was red or green or the defendant’s car 
was observed at the scene of the crime, generally do not implicate values or concerns outside of 
the immediate trial in which they are adjudicated.  There are exceptions to this observation, but 
those exceptions tend to lead courts and scholars away from a rule of deference for the very 
reasons that they have broader implications.  For example, in some contexts, such as when facts 
often recur, the question arises whether certain behavior is “reasonable” or “unreasonable” – such 
as stopping to look and listen at a railroad crossing – as a general matter.  It has long been 
accepted that appellate courts play a role in creating standards for situations that repeat.178
Similarly, although the question whether it was the victim’s blood found on the defendant’s coat 
may be particular to a single case, the issue of the validity of the DNA technology that provided 
the answer to that question is more general and may have precedential import.  In both the tort 
and scientific evidence examples, there may be good reasons for adopting a less deferential 
stance when the facts to be found have import beyond an individual case.179  This same principle 
operates in the context of constitutional-adjudicative facts.
A second, and practical, reason for a deferential appellate review standard is that anything 
more rigorous would produce substantial work for appellate courts, work which would be mainly 
duplicative of what was done below.  Although every case is important, and appellate review of 
adjudicative fact-finding might catch some errors, on the whole, this argument asserts, the costs 
178 United States v. Boyle, 469 U.S. 241, 249 n.8 (1985) (“When faced with a 
recurring situation ... the Courts of Appeal should not be reluctant to formulate a clear rule of law 
to deal with that situation.”); see OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 98 (M. Howe 
ed. 1963) (“But supposing a state of facts often repeated in practice, is it to be imagined that the 
court is to go on leaving the standard to the jury forever?”); Monaghan, supra note XX, at 268 
(agreeing with Holmes).
179 To date, the United States Supreme Court has treated scientific evidence like all 
adjudicative-fact evidence and has held that appellate courts owe deference regarding scientific 
evidence.  General Electric Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136, 145 (1997).  Many state supreme courts, 
in contrast, hold that appellate review should be de novo for scientific propositions that transcend 
particular cases.  See, e.g., State v. Hungerford, 697 A.2d 916, 920 (1997) (“[W]e review the 
reliability or general acceptance of novel scientific evidence independently when the 
determination is not likely to vary according to the circumstances of a particular case.”).
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to the system would be too great and, indeed, if done conscientiously, would quickly overwhelm 
appellate courts.
At least in free speech cases, the Court has not been persuaded that independent appellate 
review of constitutional adjudicative-facts was more work than it could handle.180  In fact, the 
Court describes independent review as a constitutional duty that it is obligated to perform.  The 
primary basis for the Court’s assumption of the burdensome task of independent review is the 
fact that adjudicative-fact resolution in constitutional cases affect the exercise of basic rights and 
help establish the parameters of the Constitution’s boundaries.  In Bose, the Court explained the 
need for independent review in free speech cases in the following way:
[T]he Court has regularly conducted an independent review of the record both to be sure 
that the speech in question actually falls within the unprotected category and to confine 
the perimeters of any unprotected category within acceptably narrow limits in an effort to 
ensure that protected expression will not be inhibited.  Providing triers of fact with a 
general description of the type of communication whose content is unworthy of protection 
has not, in and of itself, served sufficiently to narrow the category, nor served to eliminate 
the danger that decisions by triers of fact may inhibit the expression of protected ideas.181
Bose clearly recognizes the interconnectedness of constitutional law definition and constitutional 
law application.  The duty to define the Constitution’s meaning effectively incorporates the duty 
to ensure its proper application.  This can only be accomplished by some heightened level of 
review of constitutional adjudicative fact-finding.  In free speech cases this is unambiguously 
accomplished by the use of independent review by appellate courts.
In cases outside free speech, what practice applies to constitutional adjudicative-facts is 
less clear.  Space does not permit a provision-by-provision examination of this question here.  As 
180 See Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536, 541-43 (1965) (reversing state court 
conviction for breach of the peace, after independent review of state supreme court’s 
characterization of the evidentiary record and rejection of the trial court’s “feel” for the 
evidence); see also NAACP v. Clairborne Hardward Co., 458 U.S. 886 (1982) (rejecting state 
supreme court’s finding that boycott was illegal); Jenkins v. Georgia, 418 U.S. 153 (1974) 
(rejecting state court jury finding that Carnal Knowledge was “patently offensive.”).
181 Bose, 466 U.S. at 505 (footnote omitted).
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a general proposition, however, and for the purposes of the unified theory I propose, it is worth 
observing that the basic premises supporting independent appellate review in free speech cases 
apply equally to adjudicative facts found pursuant to other provisions of the Constitution.182
Specifically, the dual concerns stated in Bose – the need to ensure that particular cases are 
adjudicated correctly as falling within or outside constitutionally defined categories and judicial 
regard for the impact litigation has on similarly situated cases – are not unique to free speech 
challenges.  As is true with other constitutional facts, the degree of rigor courts bring to appellate 
review should depend on the constitutional values at stake in the respective context.  This must 
be decided as a matter of law.
The more fundamental the right or the more protected the class of individuals affected by 
the government or state action, the greater the need for independent review.  Hence, cases raising 
questions of intentional discrimination against suspect classes or which threaten deprivations of 
liberty, present compelling arguments for strong independent review.  At the same time, when 
constitutional adjudicative-facts are presented, but the right or value is not fundamental, 
independent review should be more cursory, but still not perfunctory.  For example, in Cruzan v. 
Director, Missouri Department of Health,183 the Court recognized that a competent adult has a 
liberty interest in refusing unwanted medical treatment.  But the right itself was not described as 
fundamental.  As a consequence, future adjudication regarding individual claimants to this right 
should not expect strong independent review of the factual question whether the right had been
expressed or not.184
B.  Judicial Review of a Legislature’s Fact-Finding
182 But see Rogers v. Lodge, 458 U.S. 613 (1982) (without specific explanation, the 
Court applied the clearly erroneous standard to the lower court’s finding that the defendant had 
purposely discriminated in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause).
183 497 U.S. 261 (1990).
184 In Cruzan, the Court upheld a Missouri law that required claimants to the right to 
demonstrate by clear and convincing evidence that they wished to refuse medical treatment.  This 
is a constitutional adjudicative-fact.
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As might be expected, a legislature’s findings of fact tend to involve primarily 
constitutional legislative-facts.  Moreover, legislatures ordinarily limit their fact-finding to 
constitutional review-facts,185 which typically operate to justify a particular action that may be 
challenged under the Constitution.  Such facts might support either the ultimate objective of the 
law or be used to defend the means chosen to accomplish a particular objective.  Complicating 
matters somewhat, legislatures sometimes make their factual findings explicit, and sometimes the 
legislature’s factual bases are attributed to it after the fact by the lawyers or, occasionally, by the 
courts.
Despite the seeming complexity of this arena, the constitutional resolution of the question 
of what level of deference is owed legislative fact-finding is fairly straightforward.  The standard 
of review of legislative fact-finding should abide by the same basic principle that guides the 
entire enterprise of judicial review when laws implicate constitutional values.  In a wide variety 
of constitutional contexts, the Supreme Court has established various substantive tests that differ 
in their rigor depending on the depth of the constitutional value involved.  For instance, in Due 
Process and First Amendment cases, the Court ordinarily applies strict scrutiny when a 
fundamental right is implicated, but only rational basis review when the right is not 
fundamental.186  The Court has framed its analysis in Equal Protection Clause cases similarly, 
applying strict or intermediate scrutiny when a state action discriminates on the basis of a suspect 
185 There are exceptions, and legislatures have sometimes sought to set-forth both 
constitutional rule-facts and constitutional adjudicative-facts.  In Webster v. Reproductive 
Services, for example, the Court reviewed a Missouri law which provided in the preamble that 
“life begins at conception,” thus seemingly contradicting the constitutional-rule fact adopted in 
Roe v. Wade, constructing the trimester framework around viability.  Although the Roe Court 
expressly declined to say when “life” began, it also precluded state legislatures from enacting 
laws that would be premised on an alternative view of the facts.  The Webster Court let the 
preamble stand, finding that it had no operative effect.  Legislative attempts to establish 
constitutional adjudicative-facts are relatively rare and when they occur are likely to run afoul of 
the principles of separation-of-powers.  See, e.g., Bush v. Schiavo, 885 So.2d 321 (Fla. 2004) 
(finding “Terri’s Law” unconstitutional in authorizing governor to grant one-time stay to prevent 
the withholding of nutrition and hydration from a patient).
186 See generally, Ashutosh Bhagwat, Purpose Scrutiny in Constitutional Analysis, 
85 CAL. L. REV. 297 (1997).
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classification, but only rational basis review when no such classification is involved.  This 
“tailoring” analysis is principally empirical, and courts’ deference to legislative fact-finding 
diminishes in direct proportion to the fundamentality of the right.187  The more important the 
constitutional value, the more rigorous the review.  When fundamental rights are implicated, 
courts apply strict scrutiny and the government must demonstrate that the law is closely related to 
a compelling government interest.  When a constitutional right is deemed non-fundamental, in 
contrast, courts determine merely whether the law is rationally related to a legitimate government 
interest.  Judicial time and attention, therefore, are tied to the depth of the alleged constitutional 
infringement.  This basic insight should guide courts’ hands in reviewing a legislature’s fact-
finding generally.  Hence, the greater the constitutional demand for oversight of  legislative 
decision-making – i.e., the more deeply constitutional values are implicated – the less deferential 
courts should be to a legislature’s factual findings.
Unfortunately, the answer to the question of how much deference is owed cannot be 
premised simply on preexisting standards of judicial review, such as rational basis or strict 
scrutiny.  Although basic doctrine often distinguishes in theory between strict scrutiny and 
rational basis review, the actual practice by which courts safeguard basic liberties is rather more 
complicated and considerably more convoluted.  In the context of individual freedoms, two 
problems, in particular, are worthy of note.  First, over the last thirty years, the Court has 
regularly departed from a strict and categorical approach to two-tiered scrutiny.188  The clearest 
example of this is the Court’s adoption of intermediate scrutiny in several constitutional areas, 
including gender discrimination189 and regulation of commercial speech.190
187 See generally Gerald Gunther, The Supreme Court, 1971 Term – Foreward: In 
Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 
HARV. L. REV. 1, 33-36 (1972).
188 See generally Calvin Massey, The New Formalism: Requiem for Tiered Scrutiny?, 
6 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 945 (2004).
189 See, e.g., Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976).
190 See, e.g., Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm. of N.Y., 447 U.S. 
557 (1980).
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The second problem is that in different constitutional contexts the same test is manifested 
in different ways.  In Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Service Comm. of N.Y., for 
example, the Court applied intermediate scrutiny to commercial speech and elaborated a four-
part test to determine whether a regulation infringed upon the First Amendment Right.  In United 
States v. Virginia (the VMI case),191 the Court similarly applied intermediate scrutiny but noted 
that the government must have an “exceedingly persuasive” justification for discriminating on 
the basis of gender, and, in that case, applied it rigorously to strike down a scheme of separate 
education that had been upheld by both the trial and appellate courts below.  In United States v. 
O’Brien,192 the Court framed still another intermediate scrutiny test, this time for expressive 
conduct, but applied it with much less rigor then might be expected from a test of heightened
scrutiny.193  Intermediate scrutiny, as a practical matter, has become something of a catch-all for 
a constitutional domain ranging from rational basis analysis with bite to strict scrutiny without 
teeth.
In many other constitutional areas, the Court’s statement of review is less than plainly 
stated, or, at least, not plainly applied.  In Grutter v. Bollinger, for instance, the Court applied a 
sort of deferential strict scrutiny to the University of Michigan’s affirmative action program on 
the theory that universities enjoy a special privilege to make education judgments by virtue of the 
First Amendment.194  Outside of the Bill of Rights, the Court similarly has failed to state with 
precision the standard of review that applied.  For instance, the Court has employed the 
191 518 U.S. 515 (1996).
192 391 U.S. 367 (1968).
193 See generally Eugene Volokh, Speech as Conduct: Generally Applicable Laws, 
Illegal Courses of Conduct, “Situation-Altering Utterances,” and the Uncharted Zones, 90 
CORNELL L. REV. 1277, 1282-83 (2005).
194 Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 329 (2003) (“We have long recognized that, 
given the important purpose of public education..., universities occupy a special niche in our 
constitutional tradition.”).
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deferential test in dormant commerce clause cases in a non-deferential manner,195 and under the 
generally deferential Commerce Clause, the Court has applied the test non-deferentially.196  In 
general, the underlying principle the Court seems to apply in its cases is to be less deferential to 
legislatures the more deeply constitutional values are implicated by the legislation.197  But the 
justices are not always candid or consistent regarding their views of the depth of particular 
constitutional provisions.198
195 See, e.g., Kassel v. Consolidated Freightways Corp., 450 U.S. 662, 675-76 (1981) 
(“Less deference to the legislative judgment is due, however, where the local regulation bears 
disproportionately on out-of-state residents and businesses.”; S. Pac. Co. v. Ariz., 325 U.S. 761, 
770-80 (1945) (removing extremely detailed railroad safety findings made by trial court without 
any mention of deference to legislature).
196 See United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 615 (2000) (criticizing Congress’s 
“method of reasoning”); United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 562 (1995) (“as part of our 
independent evaluation of constitutionality under the Commerce Clause we of course consider
legislative findings, and indeed even congressional committee findings, regarding effect on 
interstate commerce”) (emphasis added), citing Heart of Atlanta, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 
241 (1964).  See, also, Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1026 (1992) (“[T]he 
legislature’s recitation of a noxious-use justification cannot be the basis for departing from our 
categorical rule that total regulatory takings must be compensated.”); Nollan v. Cal. Coastal 
Comm., 483 U.S. 825, 838 (1987) (rejecting Commission’s finding that beach access easement 
was factually related to construction of a beach house).
197 Compare United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 (“regulatory 
legislation affecting ordinary commercial transactions is not to be pronounced unconstitutional 
unless in the light of the facts made known or generally assumed it is of such character as to 
preclude the assumption that it rests upon some rational basis within the knowledge and 
experience of the legislators”) with id. at 153, n.4 (“There may be narrower scope for operation 
of the presumption of constitutionality when legislation appears on its fact to be within a specific 
prohibition of the Constitution, such as those of the first ten amendments, which are deemed 
equally specific when held to be embraced within the Fourteenth.”).
198 Compare Gonzales v. Raich, 125 S. Ct. 2195, 2215 (June 6, 2005) (holding that 
the Controlled Substances Act that criminalized the manufacture, distribution or possession of 
marijuana to intrastate growers and users of marijuana for medical purposes did not violate the 
Commerce Clause) with United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 602 (2000) (holding that 
Congress exceeded its authority under the Commerce Clause by enacting a civil rights remedy 
provision in the Violence Against Women Act); see also Gonzales v. Raich, 125 S. Ct. at 2227-
28 (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (arguing that “[i]f, as the Court claims, today's decision does not 
break with precedent, how can it be that voluminous findings, documenting extensive hearings 
about the specific topic of violence against women, did not pass constitutional muster in 
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Although the exact tests used by the Court remain murky, the Court has never shied away 
from the task of reviewing a legislature’s constitutional fact- finding when basic constitutional 
values are implicated.  Examples abound in the Court’s enforcement of the First Amendment 
guarantee of free speech.199  Similarly, in the Equal Protection context, the Court has been quite 
willing to question or ignore legislative findings when suspect classifications are involved.200
Even under the arguably more permissive intermediate scrutiny applied to gender-based 
classifications, the Court has displayed little deference to legislative fact-finding.201  Finally, the 
Court’s privacy cases under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment display the 
Morrison, while the CSA's abstract, unsubstantiated, generalized findings about controlled 
substances do?”).
199 See, e.g., Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition, 535 U.S. 234, 241-42, 251-58 (200) 
(setting forth Congress’s enacted findings and later rejecting each as insufficient to support 
constitutionality); Bartnicki v. Vapper, 532 U.S. 514, 531n.17 (2001) (noting that “the dissent 
argues that we have not given proper respect to ‘congressional findings’ or to ‘Congress’s factual 
predictions’... [b]ut the relevant factual foundation is not to be found in the legislative record”) 
(citation omitted); Whitney v. Cal., 274 U.S. 357, 374 (1924) (Brandeis, J., concurring) (rejecting 
the assertion in Gitlow v. N.Y., 268 U.S. 652, 668-671, that a legislative determination that 
“utterances advocating the overthrow of organized government by force, violence and unlawful 
means, are so inimical to the general welfare and involve such danger of substantive evil that 
they may be “given great weight”).
200 See, e.g., Adarand Constructors v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 226-27 (1995) (reaffirming 
the Croson view that “all racial classifications, imposed by whatever federal, state, or local 
government actor, must be analyzed by a reviewing court under strict scrutiny”); Richmond v. 
J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 500 (1989) (“none of [the City Council’s] ‘findings,’ singly or 
together, provide the city of Richmond with a ‘strong basis in evidence for its conclusion that 
[race-based] remedial action was necessary.’”).
201 See, e.g., Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 200-01 (1976) (dismissing statistics 
offered to support State legislation imposing a different minimum age, based on gender, for 
purchasing beer as weak, inaccurate, and failing to closely serve the objectives of the legislation); 
United States v. Va., 518 U.S. 515, 543 (1996) (dismissing the testimony of Virginia’s experts 
that the admission of women to the all-male Virginia Military Institute would be so radical as to 
destroy the program as an unproven judgment, “a prediction hardly different from other ‘self-
fulfilling prophec[ies]’ once routinely used to deny rights or opportunities.”) (internal citations 
omitted).  But see Nguyen v. I.N.S., 533 U.S. 53, 73 (2001) (upholding different citizenship rules 
according to the gender of the citizen-parent).
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same disregard for the findings of legislatures,202 and this is true even when the Court explicitly 
employs the most deferential standard of rational basis review.203
Seemingly inconsistent with this steady drumbeat of little or no deference across a large 
part of the constitutional spectrum, the Court regularly extols the fact-finding capabilities of 
legislatures.204  This compliment to legislatures’ empirical acumen is a function primarily of the 
Court’s recognition that legislators typically have greater resources at their disposal than 
judges.205  Legislators can sponsor research, hold hearings, and call expert witnesses.  They also 
have great flexibility to refine their research questions and redefine the scope, direction, and size 
of any inquiry.  Justice Souter made this point in his concurrence in Washington v. 
Glucksberg,206 writing that legislatures “have more flexible mechanisms for fact-finding than the 
judiciary,” as well as “the power to experiment, moving forward and pulling back as facts emerge 
202 See, e.g., Griswold v. Conn., 381 U.S. 479, 505 (1965) (White, J., concurring) 
(rejecting asserted purpose that ban on contraceptive use furthered “the State’s policy against all 
forms of promiscuous or illicit sexual relationships, be they premarital or extramarital”); Poe v. 
Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 545 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (scrutinizing whether State’s asserted 
goals are furthered by criminalizing contraceptive use); Skinner v. Okla., 316 U.S. 535, 546 
(1942) (Jackson, J., concurring) (rejecting state’s theory of biological determinism); Pierce v. 
Soc’y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534 (1925) (finding right to send one’s children to private school 
and noting “there is nothing in the present records to indicate that [private schools] have failed to 
discharge their obligations to patrons, students or the State ... [a]nd there are no peculiar 
circumstances or present emergencies which demand extraordinary measures relative to primary 
education”); Meyer v. Neb., 262 U.S. 390, 402 (1923) (legislative preference for forming a more 
homogeneous society insufficient to justify ban on teaching of foreign languages).
203 See, e.g., Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 577-78 (2003).
204 See McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 319 (1987) (quoting Gregg v. Georgia, 
428 U.S. 153, 186 (1976) (Legislatures “are better qualified to weigh and ‘evaluate the results of 
statistical studies in terms of their own local conditions and with a flexibility of approach that is 
not available to the courts.’”).
205 In the case of Congress’s empirical acumen, the Court’s respect for a coordinate 
branch of government might also play a role in statements of deference.
206 521 U.S. 707 (1997).
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within their own jurisdictions.”207  Courts, by comparison, are more limited, since they cannot 
initiate or fund research, and the factual questions that come before them are fairly well defined 
by either the controlling law or the parties.  Judges, unlike legislators, rarely ask witnesses 
questions and usually do not specify which experts will be called to testify.  These institutional 
differences have led the Court to repeatedly express its preference for Congressional fact-finding 
and point out its own limited capacity to match the resources legislatures can bring to fact-based 
inquiries.208
While the power of legislatures to gather facts must be duly recognized, this 
acknowledgment does not necessarily affect the standard of review courts bring to legislative 
fact-finding.  Courts too are fact-finders.  Legislatures may excel in defining and financing 
research, but the courts excel at hearing controverted evidence and coming to a decision free of 
partisan influence.  Particularly federal courts, largely insulated from the shifting political tides, 
are able to evaluate evidence in a systematic and careful fashion.  District courts hear the 
evidence and accordingly must evaluate the credibility of witnesses and the reliability and 
validity of proffered expert testimony.  Moreover, there is rarely a shortage of qualified expert 
opinion.  Especially in high-profile constitutional litigation, the factual questions turn largely on 
disputed research data and expert evidence regarding general research findings and professional 
opinion.  While the judiciary may not be as well designed institutionally as the legislative branch 
to gather these data, courts are especially well designed to evaluate them.
Adopting a non-deferential standard of review in constitutional cases will not dissuade 
legislatures from compiling a full record.  Indeed, a legislature that anticipates confronting a 
207 Id. at 788.
208 Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514 , 550 (2001) (Rehnquist, C.J. dissenting) 
(“Congress is far better equipped than the judiciary to evaluate the vast amounts of data bearing 
upon complex issues”); Walters v. Nat'l Ass'n of Radiation Survivors, 473 U.S. 305, 330 
(1985) (“When Congress makes findings on essentially factual issues such as these, those 
findings are of course entitled to a great deal of deference, inasmuch as Congress is an institution 
better equipped to amass and evaluate the vast amounts of data bearing on such an issue”).
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rigorous standard of review when the matter reaches the courts should be expected to do more to 
ensure a compelling factual record.  A legislature’s natural advantage to invest in research and 
gather factual knowledge should allow it to put together a full record for the courts’ inspection.  
In constitutional contexts in which the courts are obligated to protect basic liberties or enforce 
structural barriers, they must independently review the bases for legislative actions.  Rigorous 
and close evaluation of a legislature’s factual premises in appropriate cases maximizes the 
benefits to be gained from each of the two branches of government.  Legislatures’ greater 
capacity to produce factual information complements the judiciary’s natural advantage of 
reviewing the facts largely insulated from the pressures of partisan politics.  The better the record 
amassed by a legislature, the easier will be the judiciary’s task in carrying out its constitutional 
function.
C.  Lower Court Review of Higher Court Fact-Finding
The standard model of constitutional fact-finding is limited to the description of factual 
findings as they move up the judicial hierarchy.  The previous sections focused primarily on 
establishing a coherent foundation for this standard model of facts being integrated into 
constitutional doctrine as cases ascend toward the Supreme Court.  But inherent in my approach 
was the basic insight that facts are dynamic over time, in that they themselves might change with 
advancing technology or an evolving society, or that our knowledge of them might change as 
more research is completed.  This insight poses a crisis for the standard model, since the model 
entirely fails to account for it.  Specifically, what happens in constitutional jurisprudence when 
the facts change?  In this section, I consider the most controversial aspect of my uniform theory.  
In particular, can lower courts revisit precedent in order to adjust earlier rulings to account for a 
changed factual landscape?  My answer to this question is sometimes yes, sometimes no, and is 
contingent on the type of fact involved.
1.  General Considerations
It goes without saying that the judiciary is structured hierarchically.  Higher court legal 
judgments are binding on lower courts.  This would appear to be especially so in the 
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constitutional arena.  But what happens when settled law relies upon changeable facts?  If the 
predicate facts of a higher court’s holding change, should subsequent courts revisit the holding 
given this new information?  The answer to this might very well depend on an assortment of 
considerations.  Indeed, this subject implicates many foundational premises of the American 
constitutional system.  Given the richness of the subject and the large role facts play in 
constitutional decision making, it is surprising that the Court has given so little attention to this 
matter.
Perhaps the only time that the issue was squarely presented regarding a lower court’s 
power to distinguish precedent on the basis that predicate facts had changed was in Roper v. 
Simmons.209  The principal issue in Roper concerned the constitutionality of imposing the death 
penalty on those who were sixteen or seventeen years-old when they committed their crimes.  In 
1989, in Stanford v. Kentucky,210 the Court had held that this practice did not offend the 
Constitution.  In 2003, however, the Missouri Supreme Court distinguished Stanford on the basis 
that the predicate facts on which that decision rested had changed and ruled that executing those 
who had committed their crimes when they were under 18-years of age violated the Eighth 
Amendment’s prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment.211  In particular, the Missouri Court 
in Roper found a shift in public sentiment nationally indicating that such punishment now ran 
afoul of contemporary standards of decency.  The Supreme Court granted certiorari on two 
questions.  The first was the constitutionality of executing those who had committed their crimes 
as juveniles.  The second concerned the question at issue here: “Once this Court holds that a 
particular punishment is not ‘cruel and unusual’ and thus barred by the Eighth and Fourteenth 
Amendments, can a lower court reach a contrary decision based on its own analysis of evolving 
standards?”212
209 125 S.Ct. 1183 (2005).
210 492 U.S. 361 (1989).
211 State ex. rel. Simmons v. Roper, 112 S.W.3d 397 (Mo. 2003).
212 Roper v. Simmons, Questions Presented for Review, Supreme Court of the United 
States (2005), http://www.supremecourtus.gov/qp/03-00633qp.pdf.
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Justice Kennedy’s opinion for the Court did not mention, or even allude to, the second 
question presented.  The Court, instead, limited its analysis to the principal question, the 
constitutionality of executing minors.  Affirming the Missouri decision, the Court held that 
imposing capital punishment on juveniles violated the Eighth Amendment’s ban on cruel and 
unusual punishment.  The Court relied on three grounds for its holding, all of which involved 
statements of scientific or social scientific fact.  First, based on surveys of state practice, the 
Court agreed with the Missouri court that since Stanford the national consensus had shifted 
sufficiently to cast doubt that executing juveniles met modern “civilized standards of 
decency.”213  In addition, second, the Court found that juveniles were distinguishable from adults 
in three ways that indicated that they “cannot with reliability be classified among the worst 
offenders.”214  These grounds included juveniles’ (1) underdeveloped sense of responsibility and 
general immaturity as compared to adults, (2) susceptibility to outside influence and peer 
pressure, and (3) lack of fully formed characters.  These three characteristics indicated juveniles’ 
diminished culpability which, according to the Court, meant “that the penological justifications 
for the death penalty apply to them with lesser force than to adults.”215  The final argument 
advanced by the Court to support its holding was “the stark reality that the United States is the 
only country in the world that continues to give official sanction to the juvenile death penalty.”216
While the majority opinion ignored the question of a lower court’s power to find facts 
contrary to higher court authority, the separate dissents of Justices O’Connor and Scalia did not.  
Both justices took extreme umbrage at the lower court’s temerity.  O’Connor wrote that she took 
213 Id. at 1190.
214 Id. at 1195.
215 Id. at 1196.  The Court rejected the possibility of evaluating each juvenile 
defendant’s maturity on a case by case basis.  “The differences between juvenile and adult 
offenders are too marked and well understood to risk allowing a youthful person to receive the 
death penalty despite insufficient culpability.”  Id. at 1197.
216 Id. at 1187.
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“issue with the Court’s failure to reprove, or even to acknowledge, the Supreme Court of 
Missouri’s unabashed refusal to follow our controlling decision in Stanford.”217  She conceded 
that the Eighth Amendment rule calling for a contemporary assessment of “evolving standards of 
decency” meant that “significant changes in societal mores over time may require us to 
reevaluate a prior decision.”218  But, she emphasized, “it remains ‘this Court’s prerogative alone
to overrule one of its precedents.’”219 Finally, she warned, “[b]y affirming the lower court’s 
judgment without so much as a slap on the hand, today’s decision threatens to invite frequent and 
disruptive reassessments of our Eighth Amendment precedents.”220
Justice Scalia similarly found the contumacious behavior of the lower court intolerable.  
As an initial matter, he rejected the entire premise that the Eighth Amendment’s meaning 
changes with evolving standards of decency.221  Scalia said that it “add[s] insult to injury” that 
the “Court affirms the Missouri Supreme Court without even admonishing that court for its 
flagrant disregard of our precedent in Stanford.”222  The lower court’s insolence, according to 
Scalia, was a product of a jurisprudence that permitted the Constitution’s meaning to change as 
circumstances changed.  He observed as follows:
The Court has purported to make of the Eighth Amendment ... a mirror of the passing and 
changing sentiment of American society regarding penology.  The lower courts can look 
into that mirror as well as we can; and what we saw 15 years ago bears no necessary 
217 Id. at 1209 (O’Connor, J., dissenting).
218 Id.
219 Id. (quoting State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3, 20 (1997) (emphasis added by 
O’Connor)).
220 Id. at 1209-1210.
221 Id. at 1217 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“What a mockery today’s opinion makes of 
Hamilton’s expectation [that the judiciary will be the least dangerous branch], announcing the 
Court’s conclusion that the meaning of our Constitution has changed over the past 15 years – not, 
mind you, that this Court’s decision 15 years ago was wrong, but that the Constitution has
changed.”) (emphasis supplied by author).
222 Id. at 1229.
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relationship to what they see today.  Since they are not looking at the same text, but at a 
different scene, why should our earlier decision control their judgment?223
In addition, Scalia noted that this danger was not limited to any “special character” of the Eighth 
Amendment.  “Nothing in the text reflects such a distinctive character – and we have certainly 
applied the ‘maturing values’ rationale to give brave new meaning to other provisions of the 
Constitution, such as the Due Process Clause and the Equal Protection Clause.”224  Left 
unchecked, Scalia warned, the majority’s permissiveness would allow lower courts to reinterpret 
the Constitution “whenever they decide enough time has passed for a new snap shot.”225  This 
outcome “leaves this Court’s decisions without any force,” a result that “crown[s] arbitrariness 
with chaos.”226
Possibly the starkest example of the nightmare Justice Scalia envisions, and one that 
might unsettle the more liberal-minded justices as well, comes from Stell v. Savannah-Chatham, 
discussed in Section I.  In summarily reversing the Stell district court, the Fifth Circuit stated that 
“no inferior federal court may refrain from acting as required by [the Brown] decision even if 
such a court should conclude that the Supreme Court erred as to its facts or as to the law.”227
Further, the circuit court discounted the importance of the social science evidence for the Brown 
result.  “We do not read the major premise of the decision of the Supreme Court in the first 
Brown case as being limited to the facts of the cases there presented.  We read it,” the court 
observed, “as proscribing segregation in the public education process on the stated ground that 
223 Id. at 1229-30.
224 Id. at 1228  n.9 (citing Laurence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 571-573 (2003), United 
States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 532-534 (1996), Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. 
Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 847-850 (1992)).
225 Id. at 1230.
226 Id.
227 333 F.2d at 61.
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separate but equal schools for the races were inherently unequal.”228
The Fifth Circuit, therefore, made two arguments for why the Stell trial court had erred.  
The first was that a lower court was bound by the factual findings and legal conclusions of a 
higher court, and the second was that the holding in Brown had not depended on the factual 
findings set forth in the opinion.  The latter argument was not controversial in itself, since it 
simply concerned the appellate court’s assertion that the trial court had misinterpreted the Brown 
decision.  Whereas the trial court had believed that Brown was premised on the fact-based 
psychological consequences of segregation, the Fifth Circuit held that it rested on the legal 
principle of equality.  If this legal assessment had been the full extent of the Fifth Circuit’s 
decision, it would have been unremarkable.
The Fifth Circuit’s former statement – that the trial court had inappropriately 
reconsidered factual findings previously made by a higher court – is considerably more open to 
question.  The Fifth Circuit essentially held that lower courts do not have the power to reconsider 
the predicate facts of otherwise binding precedent.  But the court did not explain the basis for this 
conclusion.  It simply assumed that it was obviously correct, much as Justice O’Connor assumed 
the obviousness of this determination in Roper.  The conclusion that lower courts cannot revisit 
constitutional facts – and, in due course, higher court constitutional precedent – is not at all 
obvious.  This statement of the law is too broad, for it fails to consider the different kinds of 
constitutional facts that percolate up and trickle down the hierarchy of the courts.  While this 
principle of deference might be obviously correct regarding some kinds of constitutional facts, it 
is not as regards all kinds of constitutional facts.  The three basic kinds of fact – rule, review, and 
adjudicative –  present very different issues regarding their place in the lexicon of constitutional 
doctrine.  
2. Specific Considerations
A basic argument of this Article is that facts should be taken seriously when they are 
228 Id.
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offered as a component of constitutional decision making.  Implicit in this argument is the 
assumption that “facts” are out there to be found.  I don’t mean to suggest, however, that 
constitutional facts – of whatever variety – can always be found with a high degree of certainty or 
without a good deal of baggage associated with the socially constructed worlds of their finders.  
Facts, whether they concern the question of when a fetus has the lung capacity to survive outside 
the womb or the question of the empirical consequences of locating adult-entertainment 
establishments in particular neighborhoods, are known with more or less certainty.  The potential 
for error associated with virtually all fact-finding means that, as a normative matter, the law must 
allocate the risks associated with making a mistake.  The law primarily accomplishes this through 
procedural devices such as burdens of proof and presumptions.  In criminal cases, for instance, 
where the consequences of making an error of guilt (“false positive”) are substantial, the “beyond 
a reasonable doubt” rule is used; in civil cases, in which similar errors of inclusion have less 
gravity, the more lenient “preponderance of the evidence” standard is employed.  In 
constitutional fact-finding, the prospect of error (whether of the false positive or false negative 
variety) should be a key element in the development of rules of procedure.  As a consequence, 
therefore, the issue of how well the fact must be known is a legal determination.  Viability, for 
example, is actually a statistical prediction of fetus survivability.  Whether the probability of 
survival must be 10% or 90%, estimates that directly correspond with gestational age, must be 
resolved as a matter of law.  What the probability of survival is at, say, 27 weeks, on the other 
hand, is a constitutional review-fact.
Professor Davis’ original division between legislative and adjudicative facts was based 
largely on the identity of the fact-finder deciding the fact, rather than the legal relevance of the 
fact.  If the fact was found by lawmakers, it was legislative, and if found by the trier of fact (jury, 
or, if none, judge), it was adjudicative.  There was thus a degree of circularity in his taxonomy. 
The very same fact might be described as adjudicative, because it was part of a jury’s 
deliberations, and legislative, because a lawmaker used it to form or interpret the law.  To a large 
extent, I turn Davis’ scheme on its head.  In my taxonomy, facts are classified on the basis of the 
demands of constitutional doctrine.  What facts are material to the resolution of a constitutional 
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dispute, therefore, depend on a reading of the Constitution.  Thus, for example, whether the issue 
of the factual consequences of a spousal notification provision, as presented in Casey, is a 
review-fact or an adjudicative-fact depends on the values inherent in the Due Process Clause.  
Similarly, in Roper, the Court interpreted the factual issue of minors’ psychological and 
physiological cognitive development as a class-based review-fact, rather than a subject of case-
by-case determination as an adjudicative fact.  The decision to treat minors as a class, rather than 
require individualized assessments of a minor’s particular cognitive capacity, was a function of 
the Court’s interpretation of the Eighth Amendment.229  As a general matter, very different 
consequences follow depending on what type of constitutional fact is involved.  The costs and 
benefits associated with those consequences are a matter of constitutional import.  The following 
sections consider some of those costs and benefits in regard to the single issue of whether a lower 
court should have the authority to reconsider higher court precedent when the facts – or our 
knowledge of the fact – on which that precedent depend have changed.
a.  Constitutional rule-facts
Constitutional-rule facts are relevant to the definition of, or establish the foundation for, a 
constitutional rule or standard.  Although the line between rule and review facts can sometimes 
be blurry, in most cases the distinction will be clear.  The distinction is based on the difference 
between interpreting the Constitution and applying it.  In Roe v. Wade, for instance, the Court 
established viability as the point in time when the state’s interests were sufficiently compelling to 
justify prohibitions of abortion, subject to exceptions for the health of the mother.  In Casey, the 
Court reaffirmed this rule, calling it the “central holding” of Roe.  The selection of viability was 
based on a host of arguments, including historical practices, the nature of the doctor-patient 
relationship, precedent, and, in the end, the Court’s assessment of the strength of the state’s 
interest in preserving the potential life of the fetus.  The Court balanced the nature of the right 
against the strength of the state’s interest and established a standard that was fastened to the point 
229 Roper v. Simmons, 125 S.Ct. 1183, 1196 (2005) (rejecting argument that because 
some juveniles have equal capacity to that of adults, that culpability assessments in capital cases 
should be made on an individualized case-by-case basis).
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at which a fetus was likely to survive outside the womb.  Viability thus became the rule to be 
applied in subsequent cases.
Describing viability as the rule to be applied suggests that if medical technology were to 
change, the contour of the “right” would change as well.  Hence, if viability is the rule, and 
viability moves from 22-24 weeks to 10-12 weeks as a matter of medical fact, then the right of 
reproductive choice should presumably move as well.  Indeed, this is one of the principal features 
of employing rules that depend on possibly different circumstances occurring from those that 
existed when the rule was first set-forth.  It could be argued that the compromise point – viability 
– was really chosen for certain unstated reasons, such as giving the pregnant woman sufficient 
time to exercise her right to an abortion.  Under this interpretation of Roe, the “rule” is not 
viability at all, but rather the end of the second trimester –  24 weeks – approximately the time at 
which viability occurred in 1973.  Of course, changes in technology or medical science would not 
affect the 24-weeks rule.  But the Court never said that the rule was 24-weeks; it said, and 
thereafter has maintained, that the rule is “viability” – whenever that should occur.
The issue of what the “rule” is in Roe is reminiscent of the debate following Brown v. 
Board of Education as to whether the holding in that case depended on the factual question of 
segregation’s effects or on the inherent inequality of separate schooling.  If the former, then 
subsequent research could result in different outcomes and segregated education might pass 
constitutional muster.  This, of course, was the Stell district court’s reading of Brown.  If the 
latter, the rule would be that segregated schools are per se unconstitutional, the Fifth Circuit’s 
reading of the case.  Given the modern test of strict scrutiny, it appears that the district court’s 
interpretation of Brown was the more accurate one and that, at least if the state’s interests were 
compelling enough, segregation might be constitutional under certain, albeit extraordinary, 
circumstances.230  If this interpretation is correct, then the Stell court’s attempt to distinguish 
230 See Johnson v. California, 543 U.S. 499 (2005) (holding that strict scrutiny 
applies to state policy of segregating prisoners by race, and remanding for determination whether 
the state has a compelling justification and its means are narrowly tailored to achieve that 
purpose).
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Brown based on different factual circumstances was wrong because it got the facts wrong, not 
because it should have refrained from any reconsideration of how the equality rule of Brown 
should be applied when the factual circumstances have changed.231
Similarly, subsequent precedent should reveal whether the rule in Roe was viability or 24-
weeks.  If the former, then changing technology should lead the Court to contemplate an 
alteration in the 24-week point-in-time, whereas if the latter, then 24-weeks should remain 
inviolate, subject always to the possibility of it being replaced with another rule.  The answer 
seemed to come from Webster v. Reproductive Health Services.232  In Webster, the Court upheld 
a Missouri law that, among other things, required physicians to use medically appropriate tests to 
determine whether a fetus was viable at twenty or more weeks of gestational age.233  Although 
the Court did not discuss the issue explicitly, it effectively accepted the Missouri scheme of 
treating viability as a constitutional adjudicative-fact.  After 20 weeks, the viability of every fetus 
was to be measured individually.  In contrast, if Roe had stood for an inviolate rule of 24-weeks, 
the Missouri viability testing provision would have been invalid as a matter of law.  Under Roe, 
therefore, at least as it is presently applied, viability is the rule and, in some situations, will be 
applied on a case-by-case basis.
The decision in Roe to adopt a rule employing the medical concept of viability also 
depended partly on factual arguments.  In particular, Justice Blackmun cited extensive historical 
sources regarding both ancient and more contemporary abortion practices.  Indeed, justices 
contemptuous of Roe’s holding have long expressed strong disagreement with this historical 
analysis.234  What if, then, a lower court had access to a new and definitive examination of the 
231 The Stell Court incorrectly reevaluated the factual question based on evidence that 
was available and which had been considered by the Supreme Court in Brown. 
232 492 U.S. 490 (1989).
233 Id. at 526.  The statute provided that a twenty-week-old fetus was presumed valid, 
so that viability testing effectively placed the burden of proof on the woman to disprove viability.
234 See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 174-75 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (“As 
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historical issues surveyed in Roe, should that Court have the authority to reconsider the rule of 
viability?  Or suppose that a treasure trove of historical documents were discovered that indicated 
unequivocally that the drafters and ratifiers of the Fourteenth Amendment uniformly believed 
that adoption of the Equal Protection Clause would not result in integrated public schools.  
Would a lower court have the power to employ these new facts to reassess the continuing validity 
of the holding in Brown?
The answer to these and similar questions is no.  Lower courts cannot have the authority 
to reevaluate the empirical bases for constitutional rules or standards.  Many reasons support this 
conclusion.  Foremost, the basic working premise of my theory is that facts must be taken 
seriously in constitutional adjudication.  This premise has two consequences in the case of 
constitutional rule-facts.  First, the sort of facts involved must be susceptible to being found with 
some measure of certainty, and second, they must, as far as they go, be subject to independent 
treatment as a matter of constitutional authority.
As regards the first reason, most constitutional rule-facts are amorphous, highly intricate, 
often defy replication, and are simply not amenable to rigorous study and exacting analysis.  
Rule-facts, as discussed in detail in Section II.B.1, are disproportionately historical in nature or 
involve highly intricate issues regarding the structural operation of governing constitutional law.  
The history of abortion practices, the original intentions of the ratifiers of the Second 
Amendment, the comparative advantage of states to operate as laboratories of experimentation, 
and so on, are all questions at bottom empirical, but for which answers will remain general 
approximations at best.
The second reason for not allowing lower courts the authority to reconsider the empirical 
grounds for constitutional rules or standards is even more compelling.  Almost invariably, 
constitutional rule-facts operate seamlessly with other authorities used to assess constitutional 
early as 1821, the first state law dealing directly with abortion was enacted by the Connecticut 
Legislature....  By the time of the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment in 1868, there were at 
least 36 laws enacted by state or territorial legislatures limiting abortion.”).
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meaning.  It can only very rarely be said that any particular rule would have been different if the 
facts had been different.  If the constitutional rule would not have been different under different 
rule-facts, subsequent changes in the fact or our knowledge of the fact should not affect the 
continuing validity of the rule.  Any procedure that would permit lower courts to reconsider 
constitutional rule-facts on their way toward revisiting the continuing validity of constitutional 
rules would have to demonstrate the essentialness of rule-facts to constitutional rules.  In almost 
all cases, however, constitutional rule-facts do not play this essential role.  Constitutional-rule 
facts are almost invariably set-forth as part of a litany of premises offered to support a rule or 
standard.  Rarely do they stand alone, and when they do they are often considered – at the time or 
later – as proxies for normative principles or values.  The historical premises underlying 
conclusions regarding original intent are routinely buttressed by arguments from the text, 
precedent, and constitutional structure.235  The Constitution’s meaning is stitched together from a 
patchwork of authorities and a change in the understanding of one or two will not necessarily 
undermine the soundness of the rule.
As a practical matter, therefore, the boundary between fact and value is nearly impossible 
to ascertain when a doctrine is premised on constitutional-rule facts and other considerations.  
Given the relationship between values and facts in interpreting the Constitution’s meaning, 
disentangling rule-facts from other authorities would be impossible in the vast majority, if not in 
all, cases.  The authorities the Court relies upon to discern the Constitution’s meaning tend to be 
a mixture of normative and empirical and their respective contributions to a given rule cannot be 
ascertained.   As a consequence, finding constitutional rule-facts is a component of law-making 
and ought to be subject to the ordinary rules of judicial hierarchy.  Lower courts, therefore, are 
bound to adhere to constitutional rules and standards, notwithstanding changes, however 
dramatic, in the facts or our knowledge of the facts supporting them.
b.  Constitutional adjudicative-facts
235 Cass R. Sunstein & Adrian Vermeule, Interpretations and Institutions, 101 MICH. 
L. REV. 885 (2003) (arguing that institutional considerations should not be neglected in 
interpreting law).
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Adjudicative-facts occupy the opposite pole from that of rule-facts in constitutional cases.  
Whereas rule-facts affect whole areas of law and are an inextricable component of law-making, 
adjudicative-facts have minimal impact outside the immediate litigation in which they are 
found.236  Because constitutional adjudicative-facts are unique to particular cases, they appear to 
present little difficulty on the question of lower court power to reconsider higher court precedent.  
And this will be true in most situations, mainly because there will be no higher court rulings on 
the specific factual question.  In a defamation case, for instance, the application of the New York 
Times v. Sullivan “actual malice” test will be highly context-specific.  The question of whether a 
statement was made “with knowledge or reckless disregard of its falsity,” will have to be 
determined on a case by case basis.237  At the same time, however, two aspects of constitutional 
adjudicative fact-finding implicate principles that transcend individual cases.  The first involves 
the obvious one that the initial definition of the applicable test is a matter of law.  The choice of 
the “actual malice” standard itself, then, is a rule that could only be reconsidered by the Supreme 
Court.  The second aspect of constitutional adjudicative-facts is a component of the first, but 
worthy of separate consideration.  The burden of proof that must be met in constitutional cases is 
set as a matter of law.
The subject of burdens of proof is considerably more inscrutable than the usual 
discussions among legal practitioners would indicate.  There is little question that the “ultimate” 
burden of proof must be set as a matter of law and is binding on lower courts.  For example, as 
236 Constitutional adjudicative-facts have somewhat greater impact than ordinary 
adjudicative-facts simply because of their constitutional genesis.  Although their resolution might 
not have any direct consequences for other cases, there may be substantial indirect consequences.  
For example, in the area of free speech, an adjudication that certain materials are obscene in one 
locale could chill their dissemination in other areas, even though the materials might not be 
deemed “obscene” in those areas.
237 A higher court, of course, retains the power to independently review a trial court’s 
findings of fact.  If the case were remanded, the lower court would be obligated to act in 
accordance with the directions of the higher court – both as to the facts and the law.  But the 
specific facts of the case are not likely to recur exactly in any other case, and so lower courts are 
not bound to adjudicative fact-finding done by higher courts in other cases.
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discussed above, in Addington v. Texas,238 the Court held that the state must meet the “clear and 
convincing” evidence standard in order to civilly commit an allegedly mentally ill and dangerous 
person.  But this seemingly straightforward requirement hides a fair amount of empirical 
complexity.  In particular, consider the element of “dangerousness” that, together with mental 
illness, must be demonstrated by the state in commitment cases.  Most recently, this issue has 
been discussed in the sub-class of potential committees popularly referred to as “sexually violent 
predators” (SVP).
In SVP cases, the Court has held that the state must prove that the defendant is both 
mentally abnormal239 and dangerous.  The Court, however, has yet to say how dangerous an 
alleged SVP must be in order to satisfy the second prong of the test, though it is likely to be at 
least by clear and convincing evidence and possibly by a stricter standard yet.  If clear and 
convincing evidence is estimated as approximately a 75 percent likelihood, and proof beyond a 
reasonable doubt as exceeding a 90 percent likelihood, very few alleged SVPs would in fact 
qualify for commitment.  The level of social scientific technology is not sophisticated enough to 
permit predictions with this level of certainty.240  But if these levels of proof mean something 
different, then the state might be able to meet its evidentiary burdens with today’s technology.
Although the Supreme Court has yet to consider the issue of what quantum of proof of 
future violence is constitutionally mandated in SVP cases, state courts have weighed-in on the 
matter.  In People v. Ghilotti,241 for instance, the California Supreme Court interpreted a 
California statute that provided for the commitment of a person who has a “diagnosed mental 
238 441 U.S. 418 (1979).
239 In Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346 (1997), the Court held that civil 
commitments of sexually violent predators were not constitutionally limited to those who 
suffered mental illness.  “Mental abnormality” would suffice, together with “dangerousness,” as 
a basis for commitment.
240 DAVID L. FAIGMAN, DAVID H. KAYE, MICHAEL J. SAKS & JOSEPH SANDERS, 
MODERN SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE: THE LAW AND SCIENCE OF EXPERT TESTIMONY (2005-2006).
241 44 P.3d 949 (Ca. 2002).
-83-
disorder so that he or she is likely to engage in acts of sexual violence without appropriate 
treatment and custody.”242  The State argued that “likely” does not mean “probable” or “more 
likely than not.”  The State urged that likely meant “a significant chance, not minimal; something 
less than ‘more likely than not’ and more than merely ‘possible.’”243 The defendant, in contrast, 
argued that “likely” meant “highly likely,” or at least “more likely than not.”244  The California 
court sided with the state and found that “‘likely to engage in acts of sexual violence’ does not 
mean the risk of reoffense must be higher than 50 percent.”245  The court explained as follows:
[T]he phrase requires a determination that, as the result of a current mental disorder 
which predisposes the person to commit violent sex offenses, he or she presents a 
substantial danger – that is, a serious and well-founded risk of reoffending in this way if 
free.246
Under California law, therefore, the kind of proof required is the substantial danger 
test.247  Yet, the burden of proof under the applicable statute is the beyond a reasonable doubt 
standard.  The court found no incongruity in asking juries to determine whether, by proof beyond 
a reasonable doubt, the defendant “presents a serious and well-founded risk of committing new 
acts of criminal sexual violence.”248  In effect, the California test asks the jury to determine with 
242 Id. at 915.
243 Id. at 916.
244 Id. at 915-16.
245 Id. at 916.
246 Id.  Oddly, the court sought support for its definition of the word “likely” from 
thesauruses rather than dictionaries.  As Justice Werdegar pointed out in dissent, “[o]ne should 
look to a dictionary, rather than a thesaurus, for a definitive statement of a word’s meaning.”  Id.
at 931 n.3 (Werdegar, J., dissenting).  She found that such a search supported a “more likely than 
not” meaning for the word “likely.”  Id.
247 Id. at 923 n.14.  Many states find that the Constitution demands a substantially 
higher standard of proof.  See, e.g., In re Leon G., 26 P.3d 481, 488-89 (Ariz. 2001) (“likely” 
means “highly probable”); Commonwealth v. Reese, 2001 WL 359954 *15 (Mass.Super.Ct. 
April 5, 2001) (“Likely” means “at least more likely than not”); Matter of Linehan, 557 N.W.2d 
171, 180 (Minn. 1996) (“likely” means “highly likely”).
248 Id. at 924n.15.  Under the law, the jury would also have to find beyond a 
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near certainty (“beyond a reasonable doubt”) that there is a significant probability (something 
less than 50%) that the defendant will be violent.  And, indeed, when it comes to scientific 
statements of fact, it is not unusual to speak in these terms.249  It would not be incongruous, for 
instance, for a meteorologist to express 95 percent confidence that the chance of rain tomorrow is 
60 percent.250  In the same way, as Ghilotti arguably requires in California, juries must determine 
by proof beyond a reasonable doubt (90-95%?) that the defendant is likely (25-30%?) to be 
sexually violent.
Constitutional adjudicative-facts, therefore, while substantially more straightforward than 
rule- and review-facts, nonetheless possess a fair measure of complexity.  As a practical matter, 
constitutional adjudicative-facts are case dependent and thus ostensibly within the procedural 
dictates of ordinary trial procedures.  Also, because they do not repeat identically from case-to-
case, there is little question but that a lower court is not bound by a higher court’s previous 
pronouncements.251  At the same time, frameworks surrounding adjudicative fact definition and 
their determination in constitutional cases are subjects of law and thus established in the ordinary 
course of law development.
c.  Constitutional review-facts
So far, there has been little of great controversy in my elucidation of constitutional facts 
in this section, in that I have concluded that rule-facts should be decided as matters of law and 
reasonable doubt that the defendant “(1) previously was convicted of qualifying violent sex 
crimes, [and] (2) has a mental disorder which seriously impairs volitional control of violent 
sexual impulses.”  Id.
249 See John Monahan & David B. Wexler, A Definite Maybe: Proof and Probability 
in Civil Commitment, 2 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 37, 38 (1978).
250 See John Monahan & Henry J. Steadman, Violent Storms and Violent People: 
How Meteorology Can Inform Risk Communication in Mental Health Law, 51 AM. 
PSYCHOLOGIST 931, 931-38 (1996).
251 Since constitutional adjudicative-facts should be subject to de novo review on 
appeal, lower courts might very well be subject to a higher court’s subsequent pronouncements 
and thus be bound on remand to follow an appellate court’s findings of adjudicative fact.
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adjudicative-facts should largely be subject to ordinary fact-finding rules, albeit closely 
scrutinized on appellate review.  Although most judges and scholars have given little attention to 
these issues, if they had, most would agree with at least the broad outlines of my analysis to this 
point.  But such agreement likely ends here.  By far the most difficult situation is presented by 
constitutional review-facts, a category that includes the vast majority of facts in constitutional 
cases.  Review-facts are relevant under a particular interpretation of the Constitution – i.e., some 
constitutional rule or standard – and, by definition, their resolution has precedential import in 
other cases.  There is no shortage of examples, including some of the better known being the 
point at which the fetus becomes viable,252 the effects of segregation on black school children,253
the general effects of virtual child pornography,254 the group dynamics associated with jury-
size,255 the effects of spousal notification provisions,256 and so on.257  As regards these sorts of 
facts, lower courts should have the authority to distinguish higher court rulings when there is 
substantial proof that the facts themselves have changed or our knowledge of the facts have 
changed, so long as those facts were necessary and sufficient for the earlier ruling.
In Casey, for example, the Court set forth the “undue burden” standard which, in turn, 
established the relevance of the factual issue of whether a challenged regulation poses a 
“substantial obstacle” to the exercise of the abortion right.  In Casey itself, the Court invalidated 
the Pennsylvania spousal notification provision primarily on the basis of research indicating its 
252 Roe, 410 U.S. at 113; Casey, 505 U.S. at 833.
253 Brown, 347 U.S. at 483.
254 Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition, 535 U.S. 564 (2002) (“Virtual child 
pornography is not ‘intrinsically related’ to the sexual abuse of children. [While] the government 
asserts that the images can lead to actual instances of child abuse, the causal link is contingent 
and indirect.”) In contrast, the specific effects on children who are used in child pornography is a 
rule-fact.  See e.g., New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747 (1982).
255 Ballew, 435 U.S. at 223.
256 Casey, 505 U.S. at 833.
257 See generally, FAIGMAN (2004), supra note XX.
-86-
potentially burdensome nature, at least in a small percentage of cases.  The Court, however, 
refused to invalidate the 24-hour waiting provision, with the Joint Opinion observing that, “on 
the record before us,” the research does not demonstrate that the waiting requirement posed a 
substantial obstacle to the exercise of the abortion right.258  Presumably, the Court understood 
that research might someday demonstrate the burdensomeness of waiting periods and, moreover, 
that other regulations might be challenged as being unduly burdensome.  Lower courts should 
have the latitude, indeed the obligation, to review the evidence to determine whether the 
regulation passes muster under the Casey standard.
The power to review the predicate facts of precedent would not, however, give lower 
courts carte blanche to challenge higher court authority with which they disagree.  When 
assessing the continuing validity of a precedent, lower courts would have to resolve two issues in 
a satisfactory and unequivocal way.  First, the court would have to determine that the changed 
fact was necessary and sufficient for the earlier ruling; and second, it would have to put forward 
sufficient proof to support the new findings of fact.
The first consideration, whether the review-facts were necessary and sufficient for the 
earlier ruling, will sometimes be a delicate task.  This assessment is easiest, of course, when 
essentially only one review-fact is offered to support an outcome.  In Ballew v. Georgia, for 
example, the Court rested its holding that the Constitution does not permit juries of less than six 
members on the single basis that panels are less effective when their numbers fall below a certain 
total, with six somewhat arbitrarily chosen as minimally required under the Constitution.259
Similarly, viability is based on a fairly concrete and unitary empirical proposition – the point-in-
time when a fetus can survive outside the womb.  In contrast, in Roper v. Simmons,260 the 
258 Casey, 505 U.S. at 887 (emphasis added).
259 The factual question of jury effectiveness is composed of two separate factual 
issues, whether smaller panels are adequately representative of the larger community, and 
whether the dynamics of small group decision-making change in important ways as the group 
decreases in size.  See generally Ballew v. Georgia, 435 U.S. 223 (1978).
260 125 S.Ct. 1183 (2005).  Roper is discussed at length supra notes XX-XX and 
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empirical arguments were somewhat more multifarious.  The Court listed three factual bases for 
concluding that those who kill as juveniles cannot be subject to capital punishment under the 
Eighth Amendment.  These included surveys of state law indicating acceptance or renunciation 
of such punishments, the physiological and psychological developmental differences between 
children and adults, and surveys of international practice and opinion.  Suppose, after some 
period of time, the evidence for one of these three premises indicates a changed empirical 
landscape, should a lower court be entitled to rely on that basis alone to distinguish the Roper
precedent?  The answer is that there is no definite answer.  Like most aspects of constitutional 
law, there is no doctrinal recipe to use under such circumstances.  The lower court would have to 
determine to the best of its capacity whether the fact that has changed was the central premise for 
the otherwise controlling precedent.  It might be, for instance, that a changed landscape as 
regards state death penalty practices would be enough, but not if the changed landscape concerns 
international standards.  But this is a judgment call.
Moreover, before challenging an established precedent, a lower court would also have to 
find that the research data are substantial enough to support the new empirical conclusion.  The 
question for courts in subsequent cases would be whether research conducted after the earlier 
decision was substantial enough to warrant reaching a different conclusion than was reached in 
the earlier case.  In the situation of the 24-hour waiting provision, for example, lower courts 
would not be able to reassess the research data that had been available to the Court in 1992 when 
Casey was decided.  A court’s assessment of an existing body of research data should be binding 
on lower courts.  In fact, lower courts should act in this realm only when the research data are 
very robust and largely unambiguous.  This is especially so when a Supreme Court precedent is 
in issue.  Given the gravity of distinguishing a Supreme Court decision on a factual basis, lower 
courts should, and can be expected to, tread carefully over the new research terrain.
There are an assortment of significant advantages that come from adopting a procedural 
rule by which lower courts can reevaluate precedent when research data clearly indicate that 
accompanying text.
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predicate constitutional review-facts have substantially changed.  First of all, it advances the 
legitimacy of constitutional law-making by keeping it in line with contemporary knowledge of 
the facts underlying constitutional decisions.  As Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. put it, “It is 
revolting to have no better reason for a rule of law than that so it was laid down in the time of 
Henry IV.  It is still more revolting if the grounds upon which it was laid down have vanished 
long since, and the rule simply persists from blind imitation of the past.”261  When a 
constitutional rule depends on a stated set of facts, the legitimacy of the outcome is undermined 
to the extent that those facts are not what the court says they are.  The rule ought to fit the facts as 
they are known today.
In addition, giving lower courts authority to reconsider constitutional review-facts will 
have a salutary effect on the Supreme Court’s sometimes harum-scarum reliance on such facts in 
its jurisprudence.  Just the knowledge that lower courts might revisit factual premises for their 
holdings should lead the justices to be more careful in explaining the reasons for their decisions.  
In Brown, for example, few, if any, constitutional scholars believe that the social science research 
was anything more than a make-weight for an outcome reached on other grounds.  But what were 
those other grounds and why didn’t the Court simply cite them instead?  The truth is that in the 
early 1950s none of the usual constitutional authorities unambiguously supported the outcome.  
The text itself was ambiguous, the precedent was weak or contrary, and original intent was 
inconclusive.  Social scientific authority provided a seemingly neutral basis for the outcome, 
though in retrospect it was not seriously relied upon.  Similarly, in Roe, it appears fairly clear that 
Justice Blackmun used “viability” as a convenient placeholder for a sensible compromise 
between the fundamental right of women to control their bodies and the compelling interests of 
the state.  Although Webster might suggest otherwise, I suspect that few constitutional scholars 
(or justices) believe that if viability were to move, say, to 10-weeks, the abortion right would 
follow suit.  By giving lower courts the authority to reconsider precedents based on outmoded 
review-fact premises, the Court should hesitate before expounding empirical reasons that are not 
261 Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 469 
(1897).
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real reasons for the outcome. 
 It might be argued, however, that taking away the Court’s ability to find facts 
“normatively” or “interpretively” will limit the Court’s flexibility to achieve outcomes it wishes 
to reach.  Only if facts are understood interpretively can they be used rhetorically to support 
whatever outcome is sought.  Especially when the Court operates at the vanguard of societal 
evolution, as it did in Brown and Roe, when traditional authorities militate against the 
“enlightened” path the Court wishes to take, interpretive facts might play an essential rhetorical 
role.  And, indeed, one should be reluctant to advocate any jurisprudential approach that would 
have made deciding Brown more difficult.
Although I am sympathetic to the argument that the Court sometimes needs the latitude 
interpretive fact-finding gives it, I ultimately find it unpersuasive.  The principal reason the Court 
relies on scientific arguments, as in Brown and Roe, is that the usual so-called neutral principles 
of interpretation are not available.  The Court, ever solicitous of its legitimacy, which has been 
historically associated with restraint and reliance on neutral principles, is reluctant to sometimes 
give the true reason for its decisions.262  It was easier to say in Brown that social science revealed 
the inequality that was inherent in segregation than to say that the Court had reached the moral 
conclusion that segregation was wrong under virtually all circumstances, despite an ambiguous 
text, contrary precedent, and original intent that was, under only the most generous historical 
view, inconclusive.  The argument from a moral basis makes the justices seem platonic 
guardians.  Science possesses the mien of neutrality, rather than the stink of judicial activism.  
Similarly, in Roe, viability as a scientific concept sounded more neutral than an opinion that 
instituted an “arbitrary” line at 24-weeks, on the basis of little more than that at least five justices 
agreed that it was a reasonable compromise between two fundamental and irreconcilable 
principles.
262 Herbert Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HARV. L. 
REV. 1, 6 (1959).
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The approach proposed here would thus take an important rhetorical arrow out of the 
Court’s quiver.  It might also weaken the Court’s legitimacy, to the extent anyone paying 
attention continues to believe that members of the Court actually adhere exclusively to non-
subjective neutral principles for their constitutional opinions.  To the extent that taking facts 
seriously will accomplish anything, it is hoped that it will lead the Court to be more plain-spoken 
about the reasons for what it does.  This might pierce the judicial veil, but it will contribute in 
one very salutary way more generally.  In the United States, the people are the ultimate 
sovereign.  The people, therefore, should be fully engaged in the dialogue that takes place every 
time the Court decides a constitutional case.  If the bases for decision are hidden beneath a
scientific facade, and the true reasons are not made plain, then meaningful dialogue cannot occur.  
The Court, perhaps, has no greater obligation than giving reasons for its decisions.  It should be 
candid about those reasons.  Anything less and its legitimacy should be jeopardized.
Another significant advantage of giving the authority to lower courts to reevaluate 
constitutional review-facts is that it will facilitate the introduction of new information into the 
law.  Although discovery of constitutional review-facts is not limited to the adversarial process –
since they can be brought to the attention of courts through amicus briefs or even independent 
research – they are likely to be developed most fully if first put into issue at the trial court level.  
The multiple-layers of the trial and appellate process are well-suited to the full exploration and 
development of the empirical record upon which disputed constitutional review-facts rest.  
Moreover, the courts’ taking constitutional facts seriously sends an important message to 
researchers.  Good research will be valued and potentially relied upon whenever it is done.  
Previous decisions relying on early research data, therefore, do not foreclose reconsideration in 
light of the publication of substantial new data.
One striking change that would follow from a jurisprudence that permits lower courts to 
reconsider constitutional review-facts would be on the Supreme Court’s control over its own 
docket.  By distinguishing a controlling precedent on the basis of changed constitutional review-
facts, a federal appellate court or a state’s highest court could effectively force the Supreme 
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Court to grant certiorari.263  The Court uses its control over its docket partly to manage the 
timing of constitutional decisions, sometimes waiting a considerable period for an issue to 
mature in the lower courts.  The rule proposed here would give lower courts some leverage in 
forcing the High Court to enter a field (or return to a field) when, perhaps, the Justices would 
have preferred to let it simmer for awhile longer or avoid the issue altogether.
Although loss of full control of its docket is a danger of the proposed rule, it is not one of 
great consequence.  Even when the Supreme Court feels its hand has been forced, it need not 
issue an opinion that resolves the dispute on the merits.  In the most extreme instances, the Court 
could reverse the lower court summarily, simply as being contrary to controlling precedent, and 
provide no further explanation.  This is not likely to happen often, however, since the Court may 
feel compelled to explain why the changed factual situation does not alter the application of the 
constitutional rule.  It might also be argued that the Court’s loss of some control over its docket 
could itself be a salutary event.  There is nothing sacred about the Court’s certiorari power and, 
indeed, such absolute control is a relatively recent phenomenon.  The proposed rule injects a 
measure of democracy into the High Court’s docket, an outcome that might increase its 
responsiveness to the pressing and most dynamic issues of the day.
Finally, it is worth emphasizing that lower courts are unlikely to exercise their power to 
distinguish higher court precedent very frequently.  They are likely to do so only when they have 
enough empirical ammunition to overwhelm the opposing precedent.  This will not occur often.  
In most of the areas in which the Court employs empirical arguments, there is limited amounts of 
research available and much of it tends to be fairly soft social science.  Even a considerable 
number of research studies on many social science subjects will not be enough to sustain a 
court’s reconsideration of a higher court’s holding in a particular review-fact context.  Also, 
many of the empirical questions the Court resolves concern highly complex matters that even the 
263 Federal district courts and intermediate state courts, of course, could also 
reevaluate constitutional review-facts, but superior courts short of the United States Supreme 
Court, could check any unrestrained enthusiasm in this regard.
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best efforts of mainstream scientists will not soon conquer.  In Kansas v. Crane,264 for instance, 
the Court discussed the scientific research involved in defining “lack of volitional control,” the 
principal component of the mental abnormality requirement in the commitment of sexually 
violent predators.265  Psychologists, psychiatrists, and neuroscientists are some distance from 
obtaining a good understanding of this construct.  Many of the facts the Court employs share this 
level of complexity.  Once the Court has weighed in with a review of the evidence and has 
provided an answer based on contemporary research, a lower court should be disinclined to 
revisit any particular constitutional review-fact without substantial research data supporting its 
holding.  As Holmes, quoting Emerson, said, “When you strike at a king, you must kill him.”266
IV. CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court approaches fact-finding much as the Catholic Church did in the 
Sixteenth Century.  Facts are not so much found as they are interpreted.  Facts are a constituent 
part of doctrine.  The High Court employs empirical claims to buttress its reading of the 
constitutional text, but scientific refutations of these claims have little or no effect on the Court’s 
continuing adherence to the doctrines built upon them.  Just as was true for the Church, however, 
the Court’s continued adherence to doctrines founded on faith rather than modern empiricism 
threatens its very legitimacy.
In this Article, I set forth a uniform theory of constitutional facts.  This theory is offered 
as a substitution for the Court’s interpretive approach, in which facts merely serve the doctrinal 
ends sought by the justices.  The Court’s approach does have the salutary effect of avoiding 
264 534 U.S. 407 (2002).
265 Id. at 411-12.
266 BARTLETT’S FAMILIAR QUOTATIONS 433:30 (1992 16th ed., Justin Kaplan, editor) 
(quoting “Recollected by Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. from Max Lerner,” The Mind and Faith of 
Justice Holmes (1943)).
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changeable constitutional standards due to changed understandings of the empirical world.  This 
stability comes at a cost, however, for a rule that has outlived its reasons for being is no longer 
legitimate.  But there is no inherent contradiction between enlightened factual investigation and a 
sound constitutional jurisprudence.  Constitutional doctrine should be informed by contemporary 
understandings of the empirical world.  This Article provides a framework by which this might 
be accomplished.
Facts arise in constitutional adjudication in a variety of forms.  Using Professor Kenneth 
Culp Davis’ famous dichotomy between legislative and adjudicative facts as a springboard, I set 
forth a taxonomy by which the variety of constitutional fact-finding can be understood.  In 
constitutional cases, Davis’ scheme must be refined to account for three basic types of 
constitutional facts – rule-facts, review-facts, and adjudicative-facts.  Constitutional rule-facts are 
relevant to the definition of a rule or standard to be applied in a set of cases.  These facts are 
instrumental in the process of interpreting the Constitution’s meaning and are typically used in 
conjunction with, and are sometimes a component of, traditional constitutional authorities, such 
as the text, precedent, original intent, and constitutional structure.   Perhaps the best-known type 
of constitutional rule-facts are historical facts used to determine “original intent.”  In contrast, the 
remaining two categories of facts are associated with the application of constitutional rules or 
standards.  Constitutional review-facts involve facts that are relevant under a particular 
interpretation of the Constitution and which transcend individual cases.  In Roe v. Wade, for 
instance, the Court adopted “viability” – the point in time when the fetus can survive outside the 
womb – as the time at which the state’s interests in prohibiting abortions becomes “compelling.”  
The scientific answer to the question of when “viability” occurs is a constitutional review-fact.  
Constitutional adjudicative-facts similarly involve the application of the Constitution, but they 
are peculiar to individual cases.  Examples of constitutional adjudicative-facts abound, including 
determining “actual malice” under New York Times v. Sullivan, and assessing whether a 
particular photograph appeals to the prurient interest under local community standards, as 
directed by the Miller test.
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Because constitutional facts vary so widely – from rule-facts such as whether small 
republics are better guarantors of liberty than large republics to adjudicative-facts such as 
whether a municipal police department intentionally discriminated against plaintiffs on the basis 
of race – the procedural guidelines that apply to them must account for this variability in a 
practical way.  In particular, two procedural aspects of proof must be considered in the 
development of a rational scheme of constitutional fact-finding.  The first concerns the question 
of the kinds of evidence that are available to prove constitutional facts and the methods by which 
such proof is to be evaluated.  The second concerns the matter of allocating burdens of proof and, 
in particular, determining how the costs of error are to be allocated between the parties to 
constitutional cases.  The problem of establishing evidentiary standards and allocating burdens of 
proof depends greatly on the sort of constitutional facts that are in dispute.  Constitutional 
adjudicative-facts lend themselves readily to traditional evidentiary rules and burdens of proof, 
since they are particular to the case and are determined by triers of fact (judges or juries) in the 
course of ordinary trial processes.  In contrast, while review- and rule-facts can be the subject of 
trial processes, they very often are introduced into the process through amicus briefs and 
independent judicial investigation, and sometimes are even found in the first instance by 
appellate courts.  Hence, while the issues of establishing standards for, and allocating burdens of, 
proof are present in regard to all constitutional facts, these issues manifest themselves very 
differently for the different forms constitutional facts take.
In addition to, and a component of, the multiple kinds of facts used in constitutional cases 
is the wide assortment of fact-finders situated along the path of constitutional adjudication.  I 
examine three principal subjects raised by the issue of the identity of the constitutional fact-
finder.  The first concerns the role of the jury in constitutional cases and, in particular, whether 
reviewing courts owe deference to the fact-finding of juries.  The second involves a large subject 
in constitutional law, that of judicial review of legislative fact-finding.  Finally, third, I consider a 
subject that might appear somewhat esoteric, but which largely encapsulates many of the basic 
issues surrounding the choice of constitutional theories of fact-finding that might be available to 
the Court.  This last issue involves the question whether lower courts might sometimes be able to 
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depart from precedent on the basis that the facts on which that authority was set have changed, or 
our knowledge of them has changed.  I conclude that lower courts sometimes should not have 
this power (in the case of constitutional rule-facts), but very often should have this power (in the 
case of constitutional review- and adjudicative-facts).
In Abrams v. United States,267 Justice Holmes, in a dissenting opinion, hypothesized “that 
the best test of truth is the power of the thought to get itself accepted in the competition of the 
market.”268  He added, somewhat laconically: “That at any rate is the theory of our Constitution.  
It is an experiment, as all life is an experiment.”269  Holmes, as perhaps the first legal realist, well 
understood the interaction between the Constitution’s words and societal consequences.  The 
Constitution may promulgate theories, but only life provides empirical test.  A well-functioning 
Constitution must be fully grounded in the empirical world and responsive to empirical demands.  
A Constitution is measured by its practical consequences.  Constitutional provisions divorced 
from the world in which they operate are destined to become empty articles of faith.  Their 
legitimacy resting on dictate rather than reason.  Our Constitution was “intended to endure for 
ages to come,” and, as a consequence, must “be adapted to the various crises of human 
affairs.”270  Only through a candid and realistic constitutional fact jurisprudence will this 
intention be met.
267 250 U.S. 616 (1919).
268 Id. at 630.
269 Id.
270 McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316, 515 (1819).
